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The Fifteenth Amendment was enacted after the Civil War to
guarantee African-American citizens the right to vote.1 The ability
2
to cast a ballot, however, did not always ensure meaningful voting
power.3 Efforts to impose restrictions on the elective franchise4
I

RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN

E.

NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.7, at 75-77 (2d ed. 1992). According to the authors,
the enactment of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, also
known as the Civil War Amendments, drastically altered the nation's political landscape. Id. § 18.7, at 75. The first of the Civil War Amendments, the Thirteenth
Amendment, states in part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment, also applicable to voting rights legislation, states in relevant part: "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For an outline
of the development of the Equal Protection Clause, see infra note 22. Finally, the
Fifteenth Amendment states: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified by Congress in 1870, specifically enfranchised AfricanAmericans by prohibiting state and federal governments from denying the right to
vote to any person. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra, § 18.7, at 77.
2 This Note uses the term "voting" as defined in the Voting Rights Act:
[A] 11action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or
general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this subchapter, or other action required by law prerequisite to
voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly and
included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election.
42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (1988).
3 See Roy W. Copeland, The Status of Minority Voting Rights: A Look at Section V
PreclearanceProtections and Recent Decisions Affecting Multi-Member Voting Districts, 28
How. L.J. 417, 417-20 (1985). Although the right to cast a ballot has been protected
for more than a century, it was not until 1962 that the Supreme Court defined the
quality of that vote. Robert S. Stern, Comment, Political Gerrymandering: A Statutory
Compactness Standard as an Antidote for JudicialImpotence, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 398, 398
(1974) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Recently, however, the Court
acknowledged that even when votes are equally weighted, gerrymandering "may minimize or cancel out the voting strength of identifiable racial or ethnic groups." Id. For
further discussion of efforts to circumvent the strength of minority votes, see John
Lewis & Archie E. Allen, Black Voter RegistrationEfforts in the South, 48 NOTRE DAME
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often frustrated the constitutional prescription, especially for minority voters.5 One important and frequently used technique to
dilute minority voting strength was racial gerrymandering. 6 In a
racial gerrymander, legislative manipulation of voting district
105, 105-08 (1972) (detailing the history of African-American disfranchisement
in the South).
4 The elective franchise is defined as: "The right of voting at public elections.
The privilege of qualified voters to cast their ballots for the candidates they favor at
elections authorized by law as guaranteed by [the] Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments to [the] Constitution, and by federal voting rights acts." BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 519 (6th ed. 1990). Conversely, "[d]isfranchisementprevents or discourages people
from voting. This may be accomplished directly by prohibiting persons belonging to
a particular group from casting a ballot .... [and] indirectly by rules and practices
that.., discourage a group of potential voters from casting a ballot." Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1, 3 (Chandler
Davidson ed., 1984).
5 See Bernard Grofman, An Eyewitness Perspective on Continuing and Emerging Voting
Rights Controversies: From One Person, One Vote to PartisanGerymandering,21 STETSON L.
REV. 783, 783-84 (1992). Efforts to impede voting rights take both direct and indirect
forms. Id. For example, direct barriers include preliminary voting requirements such
as poll taxes; and bureaucratic techniques such as incomplete voter forms, infrequent
opportunities to register, and economic and physical intimidation. See Dianne M.
Pinderhughes, Legal Strategiesfor Voting Rights: Political Science and the Law, 28 How.
L.J. 515, 515 (1985); see, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 148, 153 (1965)
(invalidating a preregistration requirement that potential voters be able to understand and interpret the Louisiana and the United States Constitutions); Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364, 367 (1915) (invalidating grandfather clauses that
exempted white voters from reregistration requirements); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d
1358, 1360-61 & n.1, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting a rural Georgia polling location, which covered an area approximately two-thirds the size of Rhode Island, because it limited the access of minorities to the political process), affd sub. nom. Rogers
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 790, 792 (5th Cir.
1965) (finding unconstitutional the discriminatory grading of preregistration citizenship tests).
Unlike direct barriers, indirect obstacles arise from practices commonly known as
"vote dilution." Grofman, supra, at 783. Vote dilution is "the minimizing or cancelling out of the voting strength of a given group through practices such as submergence in multimember districts or by practices of electoral gerrymandering that
unduly fragment or unnecessarily concentrate a group's voting strength." Id. at 78384 (footnote omitted); see also Pinderhughes, supra, at 518 (asserting that vote dilution occurs when state legislatures manipulate voting district boundaries to minimize
the minority vote). Direct voter prohibition challenges usually arise under the Fifteenth Amendment, whereas indirect vote dilution claims are brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Grofman, supra, at 784.
6 See Stephen J. Thomas, The Lack of JudicialDirection in Political Gerrymandering:
An Invitation to Chaos Following the 1990 Census, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1067-68 (1989)
(identifying a variety of gerrymandering methods, including malapportionment and
racial gerrymandering); see also RobertJ. Sickels, Dragons,Bacon Strips and DumbbellsWho's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 YALE L.J. 1300, 1300-03 (1966) (discussing the impact of gerrymandering on congressional elections); Stern, supra note 3, at 399, 40405, 411-16 (delineating the harms incurred by unlawful gerrymanders and suggesting
a mathematical remedy); Alexander A. Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote With the
Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1810, 1841-42 (1992) (identifying conflicts beLAW.
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boundaries reduces the voting power of a dominant racial group.
To counteract egregious forms of minority vote dilution,8 Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 9 Among the goals of
tween redistricting practices and the right to effective representation). A "gerrymander" is defined as:
A name given to the process of dividing a state or other territory into
the authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical
arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as, for
instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts where
the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to obvious
natural lines.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 687 (6th ed. 1990). The term "gerrymander" was first
coined in 1812, when a Massachusetts voting district, created to weaken Federalist
power, was likened to a salamander. Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportionment, Gerymandering and Black Voting Rights, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 524 n. 13 (1970) [hereinafter Voting Rights]. The district was dubbed a "gerrymander" after Governor Eldridge
Gerry signed the redistricting plan into law. Id.
7 Thomas, supra note 6, at 1067-68. Common racial gerrymandering techniques
include:
"Cracking"-A political or racial group constituting a dominant force
because of its size is broken up by district lines and dispersed throughout several districts;
"Stacking"-Instead of splitting a large political or racial group by district lines, the group is combined with a larger opposition group;
"Packing"-A political or racial minority's representation is minimized
by concentrating the group into as few districts as possible.
Bill L. Bryant, Jr., et al., PartisanGerrymandering: A New Concernfor Florida's1992 Reapportionment, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 265, 267 n.13 (1991) (citation omitted).
8 Vote dilution is a process where electoral practices combine with racial bloc
voting to reduce the voting strength of an identifiable group. Davidson, supra note 4,
at 4. While there are many types of vote dilution, a primary technique involved the
use of at-large elections or multi-member districts. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet
Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1249, 1256-57 (1989). For further
discussion of the concept of vote dilution, see supra note 5.
9 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973bb-1 (1988)). Despite the Fifteenth Amendment's clear
purpose, African-Americans were unable to freely exercise their elective franchise for
many years. DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1131
(1989). In 1870, Congress enacted the Enforcement Act to provide federal supervision of the electoral process. Id. Due to the statute's ineffectiveness, however, Congress later repealed the law, thus freeing states to enact restrictive voting legislation.
Id. Congress again attempted to resolve unlawful voting restrictions by enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 and its subsequent amendments. Id. The Civil Rights Act
facilitated case-by-case litigation to reduce discriminatory barriers in voting such as
literacy tests, poll taxes, and residency requirements. Id. Litigation difficulties, however, prompted Congress to abandon its fragmented litigation strategy and adopt the
expansive Voting Rights Act of 1965. Id. For further discussion of the Voting Rights
Act, see Katharine I. Butler, Reapportionment, the Courts, and the Voting Rights Act: A
Resegregation of the PoliticalProcess?, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1984) (surveying comprehensively the Voting Rights Act's history and proposing alternative remedies); MaryJ.
Kosterlitz, Note, Thornburg v. Gingles: The Supreme Court's New Test for Analyzing Minority Vote Dilution, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 531, 531 (1987) (explaining that the Voting
Rights Act was considered instrumental in counteracting over a century of racial dis-
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the Voting Rights Act were the elimination of tests and other devices that hindered the right to vote.' 0 As a result, increased numbers of African-Americans were added to the voter rolls." Some
local governments, however, continued to reapportion district
lines or employ new electoral systems as more subtle forms of minority vote dilution.' 2 Responding to these avoidance techniques,
Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and authorized a
"results" test to determine whether a redistricting scheme was
discriminatory. 3
crimination within the electoral system); Cynthia Wright, Comment, The Effects of Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Voting Practices, 28 How. L.J. 589, 599601 (1985) (discussing the increase in African-American voter registration pursuant
to §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
The Voting Rights Act protections are grounded in both the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. Roy A. McKenzie & Ronald A. Krauss, Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act: An Analysis of the 1982 Amendment, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 155, 172-73
(1984). Although the right to participate fully in the political process is an essential
element of a democracy, the Constitution does not expressly mandate this precept.
Id. at 172 n.77 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has characterized
the "'right to vote as fundamental because it is "preservative of all rights."'" Id. (quotations omitted); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act as a valid conduit for the
mandate of the Fifteenth Amendment); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest
for PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413, 1434 (1991) (advocating a new approach to
ensure African-American political empowerment); Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Racial
DiscriminationIn Voting, and Validity and Construction of Remedial Legislation-Supreme
Court Cases, 92 L. Ed. 2d 809, 810 (1988) (analyzing Supreme Court cases that have
considered discriminatory voting practices and remedies provided by federal legislation) (footnote omitted); see alsoJohn F. Banzhaf III, Multi-Member Electoral DistrictsDo They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1310 (1966) (analyzing the effect of multi-member voting districts on equal representation and voting
strength).
10 Copeland, supra note 3, at 420. In particular, § 5 requires states to submit voting procedure changes to the United States Attorney General for approval to prevent
circumvention of the Act. Id. at 420-21. Additionally, § 2 of the Act protects against
preregistration requirements that hindered the right to vote. Id. at 420. See infra
note 13 (detailing the provisions of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
11 See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting
Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1991) (explaining that prior to the Act's passage, African-Americans were frequently excluded from the electoral process); Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't it Apply to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?, 21
STETSON L. REv. 847, 847 (1992) (following the Act's passage, over a million AfricanAmericans were added to the voter rolls through federal prohibition of restrictive
voting schemes); see also Wright, supra note 9, at 592 (noting statistics related to African-American registration).
12 McDonald, supra note 11, at 847; see Pinderhughes, supra note 5, at 518-19 (explaining that although minority voters were added to the registration rolls, poll manipulation impeded their ability to elect preferred candidates); see also Karlan, supra
note 11, at 6 (noting that the formal expansion of voting rights did not fully empower
the minority vote).
'3 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131,
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In the early 1990s, state legislatures began reapportioning
voters into single-member electoral districts 5 to account for ex134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973bb-1 (1988)). Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 now provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
[1973b(f) (2) of this title], as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
Id.; see also Kosterlitz, supra note 9, at 531 & n.6 (outlining the subtle vote dilution
practices which § 2 sought to prohibit). For those groups whom the Voting Rights
Act and its subsequent amendments protected, § 2 replaced a previous "intent" standard with a "results" test. Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Identifying and Remedying
Racial Gerrymandering,8 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (1992). For a further discussion of the
amendment to § 2 and its affirmation of a "results" test for vote dilution claims, see
infra note 99.
14 "Reapportionment" is defined as:
A realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement
of equality of representation (i.e., one person, one vote mandate). A
new apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives among
states "according to their respective numbers," is required by Art. I, § 2
of the U.S. Constitution after every decennial census ....

A similar re-

quirement as to State legislative seats is found in many State
constitutions.
BLACK's LAw DICrIoNARY 1264 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). "Apportionment" is
defined as:
The process by which legislative seats are distributed among units entitled to representation. Determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county, or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. The U.S. Constitution provides for a census every ten years, on
the basis of which Congress apportions representatives according to
population; but each State must have at least one representative. "Districting" is the establishment of the precise geographical boundaries of
each such unit or constituency.
Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
15 "District" is defined as: "One of the territorial areas into which an entire state or
country, county, municipality or other political subdivision is divided, for judicial,
political, electoral, or administrative purposes." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 476 (6th ed.
1990) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "districting" is defined as: "[D]efining lines of
electoral districts... [and] [t]he establishment of the precise geographical boundaries
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panding minority populations.1 6 The legal standards that governed single-member voting districts, however, were not welldeveloped. 7 Today's voting rights controversies, therefore, reflect
the emerging conflict between traditional geographically-based
political representation and group-interest-based political representation. 8 As a result, the courts continue to search for manageaof each such unit or constituency." Id. (citations omitted). Reapportionment is the
redistribution of political subdivisions among legislative seats, whereas redistricting is
the redrawing of constitutional boundary lines. Bryant et al., supra note 7, at 265 n.3.
Reapportionment and redistricting, however, may be used interchangeably. Id.
A single-member district is "drawn by the legislature for the purpose of electing
one representative only for a pool of many candidates." Yanos, supra note 6, at 1812
n.15 (citation omitted). In a single-member district, minority group members comprised a majority. McDonald, supra note 8, at 1257. Because single-member districts
prevented vote dilution, one writer declared, federal courts may require this type of
electoral plan in order to remedy malapportionment. Id.
16 See Bryant et al., supra note 7, at 265 & n.6 (stating that the 1990 census compelled all 50 states to reapportion voting districts in what has been characterized as
the "'remaking of the nation's political landscape'") (quotation omitted); see also Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right ifHe Had Said: "When It Comes to
Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything It's the Only Thing"?, 14 CAmozo L. REV. 1237, 1240
(1993) (stating that in the 1990s, Voting Rights Act issues shifted to addressing the
constitutionality of single-member voting districts); Grofman & Handley, supra note
13, at 349, 394-400 (offering evidentiary standards for invalid single-member voting
districts and alternative remedies for minority vote dilution); Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDozo L. REv.
1135, 1135 (1993) (discussing the limitations of single-member districts to achieve
minority representation); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into
the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REv. 652,
655 (1993) (stating that antigerrymandering principles must be applied to preserve
effective representation through single-member voting districts).
During the 1990s, increased minority populations, particularly Hispanics and Asians,
compelled states to redraw district lines and utilize single-member voting plans.
Grofman & Hadley, supranote 13, at 349; see also Grofman, supra,at 1242 (speculating
that by the year 2000, the Voting Rights Act will attain its most significant impact for
Asian-Americans).
17 See Grofman & Handley, supra note 13, at 348 (stating that the Supreme Court
has decided relatively few challenges to single-member voting districts, compared to
multi-member district claims) (citations omitted); cf Karlan, supra note 11, at 4 (declaring that single-member voting districts may increase racial pluralism and distort
the intent of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
18 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 483 (1993); Grofman, supra note 16, at 1240 (examining voting rights controversies of the 1990s); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black ElectoralSuccess, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1077, 1079-80 (1991) (identifying the problems with current voting rights reform strategies and proposing a new
model, based on "proportionate interest representation"); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps
and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation,24
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 176 (1989) (suggesting vote dilution approaches based
on geographic compactness and political group interests). Geographically-based districting embraces physical territory as the link between representatives and their con-
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ble standards that balance racial reapportionment with fair access
to the electoral process.' 9
In a recent case, Shaw v. Reno, 2 ° the United States Supreme
Court demonstrated that race remains a complex issue when addressing the opposing forces of territory and political interest redistricting. 2 1 Declaring that the "appearance" of electoral districts are
of import, the Shaw Court held that voters who challenged the constitutionality of an irrationally-shaped reapportionment plan unexplainable on any basis other than race stated a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause.22 A voting district configured by race
stituents. Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 483. Conversely, group-interest-based
representation ascribes identities to citizens based on their political interests as a
group. Id.
19 Yanos, supra note 6, at 1841. One commentator traced the history of reapportionment cases, stating that the goal of voting equality included both equal population and effective participation in the political process. Id. at 1821. As a result of this
evolution, proportional representation, based on group interests, became the standard under which to evaluate vote dilution claims. Id. at 1822. The author noted,
however, that recent cases reflected an increasing tension between group representation and judicial aversion for race-conscious preferences. Id. at 1836. Therefore, the
commentator proffered that courts have increasingly focused on whether a reapportionment scheme constitutes state action or a federal plan. Id. at 1838. To make this
determination, the author added, courts consider the Voting Rights Act's requirements and the state's chosen remedies. Id. Because the Act did not delineate specific
methods of implementation, the author concluded, a state's use of racially-aligned
districts was subject to judicial scrutiny. Id. at 1838-39.
20 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
21 Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18, at 483-84 (citing Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827). Prior
to Shaw, the commentators explained, vote dilution, which impacted a minority
group's electoral strength, personified the nature of voting-related constitutional
harms. Id. at 493. Because the Shaw decision questioned geographically-based representation, the authors stated that the Court now endorsed a new type of equal protection challenge, otherwise known as a "district appearance claim." Id. Thus, the
authors posited that district-appearance and vote-dilution claims contain different elements. Id. The authors further postulated that each claim recognizes distinct injuries, different constitutional values, and inapposite views of the nexus between law
and politics. Id. Therefore, the authors asserted that the two claims cannot be combined as a single-approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
22 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827, 2832. See supra note 1 (providing the pertinent text of
the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court has concentrated on the Equal
Protection Clause as the guarantor of equitable treatment in the application of fundamental rights. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 1, § 18.1, at 5. When fundamental
rights are restricted, the authors noted, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the
government demonstrate a compelling governmental interest for denying an individual's rights. Id. § 18.1, at 6.
Some legislative acts, Rotunda and Nowak explained, entail explicit racial classifications that require equal protection evaluation. Id. § 18.2, at 8. In such cases, the
authors proffered, the Court will examine the law's purpose and effect to determine if
its enactment is facially valid. Id. For example, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., the Court upheld a zoning ordinance despite allegations
that the ordinance was designed to exclude racial minorities from a residential area of
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alone, the Court concluded, must therefore satisfy strict scrutiny
review to pass constitutional muster.23
As a result of an increase in population, North Carolina qualified for a twelfth seat in the United States House of Representatives. 24 Accordingly, in 1991, the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted a reapportionment plan that created a new majority-minority district, 25 District One. 26 Pursuant to § 5 of the Voting
the city. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270
(1977). Because the ordinance had no racially-disproportionate effect, the Court reasoned, no violation of the Equal Protection Clause occurred. Id.
Conversely, Rotunda and Nowak asserted, some laws may not contain explicit
racial classifications, but may be applied in such a manner as to result in discrimination. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 1, § 18.2, at 8. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, for example,
the Court invalidated a San Francisco ordinance banning hand laundries in wooden
buildings because it discriminated against Chinese laundry owners. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 358, 374 (1886). The Court based its decision not on the direct
impact of the law, but on the fact that the city granted exemptions to non-oriental
laundry owners in wooden buildings. Id. at 374.
23 Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2832. For further discussion of strict scrutiny analysis, see
supra note 119.
24 Id. at 2819. The 1990 census in North Carolina reflected a voting age population that was approximately 78% white, 20% African-American, 1% Native American,
and approximately 1% Asian American. Id. at 2820 (citation omitted).
For election purposes, the states are divided into geographical units that are established in conjunction with the office held, such as legislative or congressional districts. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 12, at 703 (1966). Although the Equal Protection
Clause governs state legislative apportionment, the states' authority to apportion congressional districts is found in the United States Constitution. Id. § 30, at 717. The
Constitution provides, in relevant part: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States ....
"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Under this mandate, congressional redistricting must
provide equal representation for all voters. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 30, at 717.
The Constitution's Census Clause further mandates the apportionment of congressional representatives by the decennial enumeration. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14.36, at 861-62 (4th ed. 1991). The Census
Clause states: "Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers
. . .. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. The federal census, conducted by the Federal
Census Bureau every 10 years, is considered a rational basis on which to readjust legislative representation due to population shifts and growth. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections
§ 15, at 705. Accordingly, apportionment laws are generally enacted at the first state
legislative session subsequent to the federal census. Id. § 15, at 704.
Population is both the foundation and the controlling factor in apportionment
cases. Id. § 16, at 705. Because a legislative scheme needs a rational basis, apportionment plans are frequently required to construct election districts from contiguous or
compact territories. Id. § 16, at 705, § 18, at 708. For a further discussion of more
traditional redistricting principles such as compactness and contiguity of geographic
boundaries, see infra note 40.
25 A majority-minority district is a voting district in which a majority of the population is a member of a specific minority group. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S.Ct. 1149,
1153 (1993).
26 Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2820. Unusually shaped, the Court noted that District One
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Rights Act,2 7 the legislature submitted its plan for approval to the
had been compared to a "bug splattered on a windshield" and a "Rorschach inkblot
test." Id. (citing WALL STREET JouRNAL, Feb. 4, 1992, at A14; Shaw v. Barr, 808 F.
Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992)). Centered in the northeast quadrant of the state,
District One narrowly tapered southward until it stopped just short of the South Carolina border. Id. Geographically, North Carolina consists of three regions: the western mountains, the central Piedmont Plateau, and the eastern Coastal Plain. Id.
(citation omitted). The African-American population is relatively dispersed and constitutes a majority in only 5 of 100 counties. Id. (citation omitted). The highest concentration of African-Americans reside in the northern part of the Coastal Plain
region. Id. (citation omitted).
27 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title
are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or
whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b(b) of this
title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which
the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon
determinations made under the third sentence of section 1973b(b) of
this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United
States District Courtfor the Districtof Columbia for a declaratoryjudgment that
such qualification, prerequisite, standard,practice, or procedure does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in
section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such
qualification,prerequisite,standard,practice, orprocedure: Provided, That such
qualification,prerequisite,standard,practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceedingifthe qualification,prerequisite,standard,practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriateofficial of
such State or subdivision to the Attorney Generaland the Attorney General has
not interposedan objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good
cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such
submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection
will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure
to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall
bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made
within the sixty-day period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to reexamine the submission if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the
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United States Attorney General.28 The United States Justice Department objected to the proposed plan, stating that the redistricting did not fully reflect minority voting strength.2 9 In response,
the North Carolina legislature created an additional majority-misixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance
with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of
section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
Id. (emphasis added).
Jurisdictions that are subject to the provisions of § 5 are defined as:
[A] ny State or... any political subdivision of a State which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or
device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing
therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per
centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November
1964. On and after August 6, 1970, in addition to any State or political
subdivision of a State determined to be subject to subsection (a) of this
section pursuant to the previous sentence, the provisions of subsection
(a) of this section shall apply in any State or political subdivision of a
State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1968, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the
persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1,
1968, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1968. On and after August 6, 1975, in
addition to any State or political subdivision of a state determined to be
subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous two
sentences, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in
any State or any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney
General determines maintained on November 1, 1972, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the citizens of voting age were
registered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of
such persons voted in the Presidential election of November 1972.
A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the
Director of the Census under this section or under section 1973d or
1973k of this title shall not be reviewable in any court and shall be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988). For a discussion of the enforcement provisions under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, see McDonald, supra note 8, at 1284-91; Kathleen A.
Bussart, Annotation, Requirements Under § 5 Of Voting Rights Act Of 1965 (42 USCS
§ 1973c) And Implementing Regulations That State Or PoliticalSubdivision Changing Voting
Procedures Seek FederalApproval-Supreme Court Cases, 70 L. Ed. 2d 915, 916-17 (1983).
28 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
29 Id. The Justice Department contended that the plan's boundaries did not account for African-American and Native American voting strength in the south-central
to southeastern part of North Carolina. Id. (citation omitted). The Attorney General
claimed that "the [North Carolina] General Assembly could have created a second
majority-minority district 'to give effect to black and Native American voting strength
in this area' by using boundary lines 'no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere
in the proposed plan,' but failed to do so for 'pretextual reasons.'" Id. (quotation
omitted).
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nority district, District Twelve. ° This new district ran in a "snakelike fashion" connecting urban population centers along Interstate
Highway 85, which cut across the state in a diagonal direction from
3
the north-east to the south-west. '
Although the Attorney General accepted the revised plan, numerous North Carolinians rejected it.3 2 Specifically, five North
Id.
Id. at 2820-21. Even more unusually shaped than District One, District Twelve
travelled 160 miles across ten North Carolina counties, cutting five counties into three
different districts and dividing towns. Id. The Shaw Court described the district as
winding in a "snake-like fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.'" Id. at
2821 (citing Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-77 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). As one observer remarked: "'[I]fyou
drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in
the district.'" Id. at 2821. The Court also highlighted poetry describing the district:
"Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Id. (quoting Grofman,
supra note 16, at 1261 n.96).
32 Id. (citing Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 113 S. Ct. 30
(1992)). Initially, in Pope v. Blue, the North Carolina Republican Party and individual
voters challenged the reapportionment plan in the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 394. The plaintiffs challenged the districts as an unconstitutional political gerrymander. Id. According to
the plaintiffs, the Democratic majority in the North Carolina legislature prevented the
Republicans from influencing the redistricting process. Id. As evidence of their assertion, the plaintiffs emphasized that North Carolina was essentially a one party state
until voters elected a Republican governor in the 1970s and the first Republican
United States Senator during this century. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted
that Republican success in the state continued throughout the 1980s. Id. Thus, in
creating District Twelve, the plaintiffs claimed that the Democrats rejected more compact plans offered by Republicans and nonpartisan groups and accepted a more contorted district to protect white Democratic congressman. Id. In addition, many of the
plaintiffs resided in areas affected by the new majority-minority redistrict. Id.
Applying the two-pronged Davis v. Bandemer test, the district court dismissed the
claim, holding that the Pope plaintiffs failed to establish their exclusion from the political process. Id. at 396-99. First, the court articulated that because the plaintiffs had
not experienced one election under the new plan, they were unable to demonstrate
the necessary history of disproportionate results. Id. at 396-97. Second, the court
determined that, due to the plan's number of "safe" Republican seats, the redistricting did not create disproportionately high Democratic representation. Id. at 397.
Although there are several different types of gerrymanders, partisan or political
gerrymandering is initiated by the political party in control of a legislature to improve
the party position and hinder competition. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The
Third Criterion: Compactness as a ProceduralSafeguardAgainst PartisanGerrymandering,9
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 301-02 (1991). The dual goals of political gerrymandering
are the retention of incumbent seats and the enlargement of seats for the political
group in power. Stern, supra note 3, at 404. "Safe seats" are generally secured by
giving each incumbent the largest possible majority and by maintaining only one incumbent per district. Id. When one party controls apportionment, the group may
increase its strength through concentrating the opposing party in a few districts and
retaining a clear majority in the remaining districts. Id. Although a district map may
look gerrymandered, the districting may sometimes be characterized as legitimate
30
31
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Carolina voters challenged the redistricting in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, asserting
that the plan created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.3 3 After considering jurisdictional issues, 4 the court declined to accept
race-conscious redistricting as unconstitutional per se.3 5 Additionpartisan activity. Polsby & Popper, supra, at 313. To distinguish the two, objectionable partisan gerrymandering intends to render ineffectual certain votes for an opposing party. Id. at 313-14 & n.56. To this purpose, voters are selected, based on
previous voting trends, for inclusion within a minority bloc within a certain district.
Id. at 314. The objective of such gerrymandering is to increase the party's chance of
electoral success. Id.
In 1986, the Supreme Court first held that political gerrymandering, which severely diluted political party members' voting strength, was justiciable under the
Equal Protection Clause. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986). In Davis, the
Court considered a challenge to the Indiana legislature's 1981 reapportionment plan,
which allegedly diluted Democratic voting strength. Id. at 115. The results of the
1982 Indiana elections, the plaintiffs claimed, demonstrated that although the Democratic candidates received 51.9% of the statewide vote for the House of Representatives, Democrats filled only 43 of the 100 house seats. Id.
Writing for the Court, Justice White held that the voters had to demonstrate both
intentional and actual discrimination against an identifiable political group. Id. at
127. The Court concluded, however, that a mere lack of proportional representation
would be insufficient to establish unconstitutional vote dilution. Id. at 131. Instead,
the Court maintained, the excluded group must demonstrate that it had a limited
opportunity to engage in the state's political process. Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, the Davis Court determined that the results of a single election would not
adequately establish minority group suppression. Id. at 135. Rather, the Court contended that constitutional infirmity turns on a political process that continually debases a voting group's influence on the total electoral system. Id. at 132.
33 Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 462-63 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd, Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816 (1993). In Shaw v. Barr,five white voters from Durham County, North
Carolina filed an action against United States Attorney General William Barr and
other federal and state officials. Id. Prior to the reapportionment, the plaintiffs were
registered to vote in the same district, but under the revised plan were then separated
into three districts. Id. at 464. When the action was finally appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, however, the challenge was amended to include the present
United States Attorney General, Janet Reno. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2820.
34 The district court dismissed the challenge against the federal defendants, concluding in part that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking under § 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 466-67. Section 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act
provides in relevant part: "No court other than the District Court for the District of
Columbia... shall have jurisdiction to issue any... restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of [Section 5, inter alia]
or any action of any Federal Officer or employee pursuant thereto." 42 U.S.C.
§ 19731(b) (1988). The district court declared, therefore, that § 14 conferred original
jurisdiction for actions challenging the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act only
upon the District Court for the District of Columbia. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 466. The
court further reasoned that § 14(b) did not apply to actions involving mere coverage
applications of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act. Id. (citations omitted)).
35 Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 470. Relying on United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that race-conscious redistricting was unconstitutional. Id. (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 159 (1977)). The
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ally, because the plan was not adopted with a discriminatory purpose and effect, the lower court held that the reapportionment
6
plan was valid under the Voting Rights Act.1
court noted that to comply with the Voting Rights Act, racial considerations could be
utilized when redistricting. Id. at 471 (citing United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 159).
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' reliance on decisions that supported the
"unconstitutional per se" challenge. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that these decisions illuminated a new "color-blind" constitutional concept, stating
that none of the supporting cases squarely addressed voting rights. Id. (citing Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (upholding racially-motivated juror challenges);
Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600-01 (1990) (upholding racial setasides of federal broadcast licenses); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 511 (1989) (invalidating racial set-aside program for municipal public contracts);
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1450 (1992) (holding that the district court could
relinquish control over a school desegregation case prior to full compliance)).
36 Id. at 472 (citing UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165-68). The court concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to meet this test because a mere intent to favor African-American voters was not within the meaning of "'invidious'" discrimination under Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 473. Additionally, the court proffered that
the plan would not lead to a statewide underrepresentation of nonminority voters. Id.
The majority clarified, however, that a "reverse-discrimination" vote dilution case
could still be established against a state redistricting plan. Id. To maintain such a
claim, the court asserted, the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate the requisite discriminatory purpose and effect upon them as members of an identifiable group. Id.
Because the plaintiffs did not identify themselves as white in their complaint, the
court asserted that a specific constitutional injury as members of a particular classification had not been established. Id.
Partially dissenting, Chief District Judge Voorhees disagreed with the majority's
reliance on United Jewish Organizations. Id. at 474 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 144). Specifically, the
dissent rejected the view that a state legislature had unlimited discretion when considering race in redistricting plans. Id. The chiefjudge further asserted that while race
may be one factor in reapportionment, it is not the sole constitutional criterion. Id. at
475 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the dissent
argued that a State must employ sound districting principles, such as compactness
and population equality, to afford fair representation to racial minorities. Id. at 476
(Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chief District Judge Voorhees emphasized that in United Jewish Organizations,
compact majority white districts continued to outnumber the nonwhite majority districts, thus mitigating harm to white voters. Id. at 477 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, the dissent rejected geographically diverse
white majority districts as a mitigating factor. Id. The chief judge contended that in
the present case, there was little chance that a voter from the eastern coastal plain
would be adequately represented by a representative from mountainous western
North Carolina. Id.
Finally, the dissent noted that the reapportionment plan in UnitedJewishOrganizations included a compact majority-minority district that encompassed African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. Id. at 478 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In contrast, the chiefjudge stated that the Attorney General
had rejected the original North Carolina reapportionment plan because it did not
account for African-American and Native American voting strength in the southeastern quadrant of the state. Id. The chiefjudge emphasized that the General Assembly
ignored the Attorney General's suggestion when creating the noncompact, majority
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The North Carolina voters appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court.3 7 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 8 to determine whether an irregularly-shaped single-member voting district based solely on race amounted to an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.3 9 Reversing the district court,
the Court held that an irrationally-shaped reapportionment plan
lacked compelling justification when designed solely to ensure minority representation in Congress.4" Because North Carolina did
black District Twelve. Id. at 479 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Such purposeful disregard, the dissent concluded, could not be presumed constitutional or free from invidious discrimination until fully ascertained at trial. Id.
37 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2822. Direct appeals to the United States Supreme Court
are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1253, which provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and
hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action,
suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges.
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988). The Supreme Court's ability to hear direct appeals of federal court decisions is severely limited to cases heard by special panels of three district
judges designated by Congress. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.02, at 95-96; see, e.g.,
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1993) (considering appeal directly from a
three-judge district court involving eight majority-minority state electoral districts);
Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1077 (1993) (appealing directly from a three-judge
panel of a Minnesota federal district court regarding a state's effort to redraw legislative and congressional districts); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 52, 54 (1964)
(hearing a direct appeal from a three-judge district court in a case involving a constitutional challenge to four New York congressional districts).
38 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2822.
39 Id. at 2819-20.
40 Id. at 2832. The Court noted the appellants' contention that the redistricting
failed to consider compactness, geographical boundaries, contiguousness, or political
subdivisions. Id. at 2821.
Until Baker v. Carr, malapportionment was a powerful tool in counteracting the
constitutionally mandated right to vote. Polsby & Popper, supra note 32, at 303 &
n.12 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). For example, gerrymandering may
be used to redraw district lines to dilute the fair and effective representation of identifiable racial or political groups. Id. Furthermore, gerrymandering may harm democratic institutions, because the power of self-selection may insulate legislatures from
the popular will. Id. at 304, 305. Conversely, an effective gerrymander could serve to
increase the disparity between a party's actual support among constituents and its
seats within the legislature. Id. at 333. A procedurally fair election, therefore, utilizes
three interdependent districting criterion to neutralize the ability to gerrymander:
equinumerosity, contiguity and compactness. Id. at 332.
Equinumerosity places approximately equal numbers of people in each voting
district, thus deflecting the opportunity to unfairly skew election outcomes. Id. at 328.
The mere principle of equinumerosity, however, is insufficient to counteract the effects of majority rule. Id. Contiguity requires a physical connection between all parts
of an electoral district. Id. at 330 & n.139 (citation omitted). Contiguity is often
employed as a remedy for the defects that result from equinumerosity. Id. Although
a contiguity requirement may effectively diminish available districting options,
noncompactness may render contiguity irrelevant. Id. at 330-31.
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not provide sufficient justification for creating such a district, the
Court concluded that the voters had established a cognizable claim
,under the Equal Protection Clause.4
The Supreme Court first announced that apportionment issues were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause in the
landmark case of Baker v. Carr. 4 2 In Baker, urban voters43 chalAccordingly, compactness, a third districting criterion, is indispensable to an effective gerrymander and should be required to ensure valid election results. Id. at
331. Compact is defined as:
Closely or firmly united or packed, as the particles of solid bodies; firm;
solid; dense, as a compact texture in rocks; also, lying in a narrow compass or arranged so as to economize space; having a small surface or
border in proportion to contents or bulk; close, as a compact estate, or
a compact order or formation of troops.
BLACK'S LAw DCTIONARY 281 (6th ed. 1990). The compactness requirement minimizes the effects of gerrymandering by requiring districts to be geographically united
or close. Stern, supra note 3, at 412, 413, 415. Because individuals within the same
ethnic, racial, and economic groups may not always live within the same geographic
proximity, the utilization of significant political subdivisions may also bolster effective
representation. Id. at 415. Geographic units may include traditional practices or organizations, such as reform groups and voters' leagues, that facilitate political participation. Id. Therefore, a legislature must justify noncompactness by showing that the
historical significance was a neutral element, rather than a gerrymander in disguise.
Id. at 415-16.
Another districting criteria, utilized to achieve effective gerrymandering, includes setting up "communities of interest." Polsby & Popper, supra note 32, at 340 &
n.182. A "community of interest" is an "interest common to both or all parties, that is,
mixture or identity of interest in venture wherein each and all are reciprocally concerned and from which each and all derive material benefit and sustain a mutual
responsibility." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 280 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
41 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. For an additional analysis of the Shaw decision, see
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18.
42 369 U.S. 186, 209, 226 (1962). For a detailed discussion of the Baker decision,
see James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v.
Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.
REV. 1, 6-9 (1982); Note, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments: A Problem of
Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968 (1963) [hereinafter Standards]. The Supreme Court initially addressed reapportionment issues in Colegrove v. Green. See Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946). In Colegrove, the Court considered a challenge to an Illinois
redistricting plan that contained an unequal distribution of population among voting
districts. Id. at 550-51. The plaintiffs primary claim was that, in addition to population inequality, the districts lacked compactness. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice
Frankfurter stated that the matter was incompetent to adjudicate due to its "particularly political nature." Id. at 552. The Court reasoned that it lacked the remedial
powers to create alternatives to the existing plan. Id. at 552-53. To this purpose, the
Court asserted that individuals seeking redress should exercise political rights protected by the Constitution. Id. at 556. The Constitution, the Court continued, conferred authority for effective representation upon Congress, and if that duty was
neglected, the ultimate authority for resolving those disputes rested with the citizenry.
Id. at 554. As a result, Justice Frankfurter warned of the hazards of embroiling the
judiciary in the politics of the people. Id. The Justice cautioned future courts to
avoid the "political thicket of redistricting cases." Id. at 556.
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lenged a Tennessee apportionment plan that had not been redistricted since 1901.

4

The plaintiffs asserted that sixty years of

migration towards Tennessee's urban areas had created population
disparities that inequitably favored residents of rural areas. 45 The
voters therefore argued that the apportionment plan contravened
their constitutional guarantee of an unimpaired voice in the electoral process.46
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan repudiated earlier
cases that held malapportionment controversies presented nonjusticiable political questions.4 7 Instead, the Baker majority asserted
that the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against racial disFourteen years after Colegrove, the Supreme Court demonstrated that not all districting issues raised nonjusticiable political questions. See Blacksher & Menefee,
supra, at 6. For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court considered an Alabama
state law that transformed the City of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twentyeight-sided figure." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960). The effect of
the alteration removed from the city limits all but a few of Tuskegee's substantial
African-American population. Id. at 341.
Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter recognized the state's right to alter
the boundaries of its individual municipalities. Id. at 342. Rejecting a nonjusticiable
political question argument, however, the Court stated that the violation of rights
guaranteed to racial minorities under the Fifteenth Amendment "lift[ed] th[e] controversy out of the so-called 'political' arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation." Id. at 346-47. Distinguishing Colegrove, the Court relied upon the
Fifteenth Amendment and declared that no state had the right to deprive a citizen of
the right to vote on the basis of race. Id. at 346. See generally David P. Van Knapp,
Annotation, DilutingEffect of Minorities' Votes by Adoption of ParticularElection Plan, or
Gerrymanderingof Election District,as Violation of Equal Protection Clause of Federal Constitution, 27 A.L.R. FED. 29, 34 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court in Gomillion invalidated the practice of redrawing municipal boundaries to exclude African-Americans
from voting districts).
43 Plaintiffs included the residents of the cities of Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, Tennessee. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 & n.23.
44 Id. at 192 (footnote omitted). In 1901, Tennessee's population amounted to
2,020,616 persons, 487,380 of whom were eligible to vote. Id. (footnote omitted). By
1960, the Federal Census reported the state population at 3,567,089, of which
2,092,891 were eligible to vote. Id. (footnote omitted).
45 Id. at 193-94. The plaintiffs characterized the current redistricting statute as not
only "obsolete" but also "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 193, 207.
46 Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). The plaintiffs asserted their rights were denied
under the Fourteenth Amendment due to vote dilution. Id.
47 Id. at 208-09 (citations omitted). Justice Brennan asserted that the lower courts
had misinterpreted Colegrove and that reapportionment did not present nonjusticiable
political questions. Id. The Justice admitted that a particular case might be so intertwined with political issues, as to render it nonjusticiable. Id. at 227. The Justice
asserted, however, that malapportioned state legislatures could be addressed on a
case-by-case basis to determine if the purported "discrimination reflects no policy, but
simply arbitrary and capricious action." Id. at 226. Justice Brennan noted that the
critical component in political question analysis was the lack of manageable judicial
standards. Id. at 210 (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939) (footnote
omitted)).
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crimination justified judicial intervention in legislative reapportionment.4 " Justice Brennan opined, therefore, that equal
protection standards governed state redistricting plans.4 9 DeclinThe political question doctrine, the BakerCourt espoused, constituted the following elements:
[C]onstitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. Applying the political question doctrine to Baker, the Court concluded that
none of these identifying elements were present. Id. at 226. The Court justified its
actions, stating: (1) the issue was within the sole purview of the Court; (2) a Tennessee reapportionment challenge did not risk domestic turmoil or foreign political embarrassment; and (3) judicially manageable standards were available under the Equal
Protection Clause. Id.
48 Id. at 228-29. Analogizing the case at bar to Gomillion, the Court concluded that
the Tennessee voters' claim was properly within its jurisdiction because the reapportionment plan discriminated against racial minorities in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Id. at 229-30. Legislative control of municipalities, the Court acknowledged, rested within the scope of relevant constitutional limitations. Id. at 230 (quotation omitted). Conversely, the Court noted that the State's position would sanction
any state action that impaired voting rights, as long as it was disguised as mere political realignment. Id. (quotation omitted). Acknowledging that the exercise of state
power over state interests was immune from judicial review, the Court declared that
such immunity was lost when fundamental rights were circumvented. Id. at 231 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
49 Id. at 226. Although recognizing the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition
against the denial of voting rights, Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, did not find a corresponding right to equal representation within the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 301
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Justice provided three reasons why malapportionment claims should not be subject to judicial review: (1) the judiciary's unnecessary
intrusion into matters reserved for the legislature; (2) the complexity in developing
judicially manageable standards; and (3) the intricacy of developing adequate remedies. Id. at 277-78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter was particularly
concerned with the lack of manageable standards for reapportionment issues. Id. at
283 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The Justice further contended
that because voters were permitted to vote, the argument of vote debasement was
"circular talk." Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Justice also cautioned that
the Court's decision would burden courts with reconciling complex policy factors. Id.
at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In a separate dissent, Justice Harlan asserted that the apportionment plan was
not an unreasonable or arbitrary classification of voting strength. Id. at 334 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Additionally, the Justice stated that there could be no Fourteenth
Amendment violation where a rational policy was presented in support of the apportionment plan. Id. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Justice proffered that the electoral imbalance may have resulted from the State's attempt to protect agricultural
interests from the sheer numbers of those residing in the cities. Id. at 346-47 & nn.911 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ing to establish a specific criteria for malapportionment claims,
however, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had established a
constitutional claim by virtue of the mere debasement of their
votes.5 0
The Supreme Court further defined the Baker standard in
Reynolds v. Sims,5 1 formulating a new population-based constitutional rule of "one person, one vote." 52 The Reynolds plaintiffs, AlaConcurring, Justice Clark declared that a state's redistricting required a rational
basis. Id. at 258 (Clark, J., concurring). The Justice concurred with the majority's
position, however, stating that the Tennessee apportionment did not fit any rational
design. Id.; see also Standards, supra note 42, at 970 (positing that the Fourteenth
Amendment Baker test required reapportionment plans to be rationally related to legitimate public and social policies).
After Baker, courts adopted the position that the Equal Protection Clause required adherence to equal representation. Id. at 972 (citations omitted). Advocates
of this position contended that discrimination based on geography, political subdivisions, insular minorities, and other factors were as constitutionally repugnant as traditional forms of discrimination. Id. Proponents of this view, therefore, considered any
variation from absolute equality, absent the need to follow county or precinct lines, as
impermissible. Id.
Critics of this premise claimed that the Baker Court intended only a minimum
rationality test. Id. at 973 (citations omitted). Under this view, the Equal Protection
Clause did not prohibit legislative apportionment based on criteria other than population. Id. Furthermore, the critics maintained that societal interests would make it
undesirable to continue strict adherence to exacting requirements for equal protection. Id. at 973-74. Accordingly, these commentators asserted that apportionment is
only one way in which to allocate power in the governing process. Id. at 974. Lastly,
these proponents believed it may be necessary to overrepresent some interests to remediate underrepresentation in other areas of the political process. Id.
50 Baker, 369 U.S. at 193. The Justice proffered that the "well developed and familiar" standards of the Equal Protection Clause would govern judicial review. Id. at 226.
Two years after Baker, the Supreme Court applied equal protection principles to congressional minority vote-packing apportionment plans. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52, 54 (1964) (citation omitted). In Wright, the Court considered a claim that
New York County had divided into four congressional districts that "packed" AfricanAmericans and Puerto Ricans into three districts, while leaving the fourth for nonminority voters. Id. at 54-55. The Court rejected the claim, stating that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that the New York Legislature was racially motivated when it enacted the reapportionment statute. Id. at 58.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, speculated that the effect of the redistricting was to
exclude minorities from the nonminority district. Id. at 60-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas concluded that, based on the effects of the legislation, statesponsored racial segregation should be nullified. Id. at 61 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
52 Id. at 568; NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supranote 24, § 14.35, at 851. For an additional
discussion of Reynolds, see Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 42, at 4-5 (discussing the
evolution of the "one man, one vote" doctrine and the Supreme Court's efforts to
develop judicially manageable standards for minority vote dilution); Butler, supra
note 9, at 9-10 (discussing population-based parameters under Reynolds); Karlan, supra
note 18, at 174 (asserting that the geographic compactness standard of Reynolds did
not apply to racial vote dilution); Evan Geldzahler, Note, Davis v. Bandemer: Remedial Difficulties in PoliticalGerrymandering,37 EMORY L.J. 443, 459 (1988) (offering use
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bama voters and taxpayers, alleged a deprivation of votes based on
the state's failure to reapportion its legislative districts in sixty
years.5" The existing legislative map, the plaintiffs claimed, demonstrated severe representation differences that were unreflective of
population growth in urban locales. 4
Writing for the majority, ChiefJustice Warren maintained that
the constitutional right to vote inferred a corresponding right to
voting strength. 55 The Court declared, therefore, that an individual vote was unconstitutionally impaired if that vote carried less
of computer technology to remedy unlawful political gerrymanders); Yanos, supra
note 6, at 1816 (acknowledging Reynolds's establishment of the individual right to
equal political participation, but noting that recent Supreme Court decisions disfavored racial classifications).
Professors Nowak and Rotunda suggested that the Supreme Court's foundation
for the "one person, one vote" principle was based on the Equal Protection Clause,
enunciated in Gray v. Sanders and Wesberry v. Sanders. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
24, § 14.35, at 851 (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964)). In Gray, the Court invalidated Georgia's county-unit system of
nominating the Governor and other Georgia state officials. Gray, 372 U.S. at 370-71,
381. Under Georgia law, candidates who won by a majority of county votes in the
primaries carried all of the county electoral units in the general elections. Id. at 371
(footnote omitted). Striking down the electoral system, the Court concluded that
Georgia's electoral system unfairly weighted voters in rural counties more heavily than
those residing in urban counties. Id. at 379. Although the county units were not
allocated by population, the Court asserted that equal population would not remedy
an electoral system where the winner of a county won all of its unit votes. Id. at 381
n.12. Therefore, the Court championed political equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment as "one person, one vote." Id. at 381.
Following Gray, the Wesbeny Court considered Georgia's system of congressional
district apportionment. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2. At the time of the suit, Georgia's
congressional districts had dramatic population disparities and had not been reapportioned in almost 30 years. Id. at 2, 7. Applying the "one person, one vote" standard,
the Court held that Georgia must fulfill the constitutional mandate affording "equal
representation for equal numbers of people." Id. at 7-8, 18 (footnotes and citations
omitted).
Some commentators claim that questions concerning state legislative reapportionment still remained after Wesberry and Gray. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 9,
§ 10.03, at 694. The unresolved redistricting issues included the influence of political
subunits, acceptable population deviations, and population shifting on formulating
redistricting plans. Id. The Reynolds decision, legal scholars argue, only provided the
initial inquiry into racial and political gerrymandering. Id.
53 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540. This deprivation, the Reynolds plaintiffs claimed, violated their voting rights under the Alabama Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 537.
54 Id. at 545-46.
55 Id. at 562-63. The fundamental right to vote, the Chief Justice proclaimed, implied a right to have that vote count. Id. at 554 (citation omitted). Declaring that
"[1] egislators represent people, not trees or acres," the Court posited that a representative government guarantees equal representation regardless of race, economic status,
sex, or place of residence. Id. at 561, 562.
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weight than the votes of citizens in other parts of the state. 6 An
individual voter's place of residence, the Court articulated, was not
a valid reason for overweighing or diluting the effects of her vote.
Thus, the Reynolds Court asserted that a legislative district's population was a prevailing factor when evaluating malapportionment
controversies. 5 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the "one
person, one vote" standard was the most appropriate way to determine equal representation based on population. 59
In White v. Regester,6 ° however, the Supreme Court declined to
rely on a strict interpretation of the "one man, one vote" rule. 6 '
Instead, the Court adopted a "results" test that required plaintiffs
56

Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).

57 Id. at 567. In light of the nation's rapid development from a rural to urban

society, the Chief Justice stated that electoral schemes quickly become obsolete. Id.
(footnote omitted). The ChiefJustice added, however, that the fundamental premise
of representative government must remain unchanged-the strength of an individual's vote cannot depend on place of residence. Id. at 567-68.
58 Id. at 568. Justice Harlan dissented, declaring that "people are not ciphers and
that legislators can represent their electors only by speaking for their interests-economic, social, political-many of which do reflect the place where the electors live."
Id. at 623-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Karlan, supra note 18, at 179 (interpreting Justice Harlan's declaration to mean that voters are not a fungible commodity
when entering the voting booth).
59 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
60 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
61 Id. at 763; Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act: What is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (citing Regester, 412
U.S. at 765-66); see also Butler, supra note 9, at 11-12 (opining that after Reynolds,
lawmakers would have a "gerrymanderer's holiday" with no limitations for redistricting other than population).
Prior to Regester, the Court declined to find multi-member voting districts unconstitutional per se, but speculated that a plan would be unconstitutional if it "minimize [d] or cancel[led] out the voting strength of racial or political elements in the
voting population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). In Fortson, the plaintiffs alleged that Georgia's at-large electoral scheme diluted the strength of racial minorities, despite approximately equal population. Id. at 436, 439. Because the
plaintiffs could not prove that the state's voting system minimized the strength of
their vote through the inability to elect preferred candidates, the Court rejected the
constitutional claim. Id. at 436-37, 439; see also Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88
(1966) (reaffirming Fortson's holding that multi-member districts, which despite
nearly equal population intentionally minimized the minority vote, are invalid) (citing Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439).
In 1971, the Court finally considered the merits of a constitutional challenge to a
reapportionment plan that included one multi-member voting district. Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 127 (1971). Writing for the Court,Justice White concluded that
the mere lack of successful elections was not dispositive of an equal protection violation. Id. at 153. The Court further asserted that absent sufficient proof, invalidating
the plan would encourage any special interest group-political, ethnic, union, or religious-to assert their right to representation via a multi-member electoral system. Id.
at 156 (footnote omitted). The Court, however, did not endorse single-member voting districts as a remedy for vote dilution within multi-member districts. Id. at 160.
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to prove that the political process, under which legislative representatives were nominated and elected, did not provide minority
groups with equal protection. 62 In Regester, African-American and
Mexican-American voters challenged a Texas reapportionment
plan, despite nearly equal population among voting districts.6"
Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the use of multi-member
districts6 4 in both Dallas and Bexar Counties unconstitutionally diluted their votes.6 5
62 Id. at 766 (citing Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-50). Under this standard, the Court
clarified, a plaintiff had the burden of showing "that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice." Id. (citing Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 766). For a more
detailed discussion of the Regester "results" standard and its incorporation into
amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, see Miller & Packman, supra note 61, at 2-16;
McDonald, supra note 8, at 1265-66.
63 Regester, 412 U.S. at 758-59, 761-62. The Court noted that the Texas House of
Representatives consisted of 150 members, elected from 79 single-member and 11
multi-member districts. Id. at 758. Under the plan, an ideal district contained 74,645
persons. Id. at 761. The districts, as currently apportioned, however, ranged from
71,597 to 78,943 in population for each representative. Id. This deviation resulted in
a total variation of 9.9% between the smallest and largest district. Id. (footnote
omitted).
Addressing population shifts, cases subsequent to Regester indicated that apportionment plans with less than 10% population deviation would be held constitutional.
CRUMP ET AL., supra note 9, § 10.03, at 699-700 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 329 (1973) (upholding district population deviations of up
to 9.6%); c.f Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418, 420-21 (1977) (invalidating population variances for the Senate and House of Representatives of 16.5% and 19.3%, respectively). Because congressional redistricting is based on the more stringent
requirements of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, more exacting population
disparities may be required. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 9, § 10.03, at 699-700 (citing
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728, 744 (1983) (striking a congressional redistricting plan with 0.6984% population variance)).
64 Multi-member voting districts, in which two or more representatives are elected
from a single district, tend to submerge the voting strength of minority groups. Note,
Racial Vote Dilution in Multimnember Districts: The ConstitutionalStandardAfter Washington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REv. 694, 696, 697 (1978) [hereinafter Racial Vote Dilution].
One commentator hypothesized that if a district containing an African-American majority combined with a majority white voting district, the result could undercut the
minority vote. Id. at 695. Because multi-member voting will not always dilute minority voting strength, however, the Supreme Court has declined to hold this type of
electoral system as unconstitutional per se. Id. (footnote omitted). Instead, the Court
will consider the specific local political environment. Id. at 696. In a locale with a
history of racial discrimination, bloc voting may prevent the election of minority candidates. Id. at 696-97. Bloc voting is the practice of voting only for candidates from a
specific group. Davidson, supra note 4, at 4. Through the use of bloc voting, the
majority group can prevent minority voters from electing preferred candidates. Id.
The result is vote dilution which counteracts the objectives of the Voting Rights Act.
Id. Bloc voting in multi-member voting districts, therefore, may effectively decrease
representation for minority groups. Racial Vote Dilution, supra, at 697.
65 Regester, 412 U.S. at 759, 766-67.
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White concluded that
a claim of disproportionate representation based on population
was insufficient to demonstrate that the multi-member districts
were being used to dilute minority voting strength.6 6 The Court
invalidated the plan, however, on grounds that it did not allow minorities equal participation in the electoral scheme.6 7 Justice
White first noted the locality's history of racial discrimination. 8
Observing the existence of racial campaign tactics,69 the Court
found that since the Reconstruction, only two African-Americans
were elected in Dallas County to the Texas House of Representatives.70 The Court also considered that restrictive voter registration
requirements and cultural barriers inhibited minority participation
in the electoral process.7 Assessing the "totality of circumstances,"
therefore, Justice White concluded that the multi-member districts
effectively excluded minority participation in political life.7 2 The
Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 766 (citation omitted). Specifically, Justice White noted the district
court's finding that the history of racial discrimination in Texas had negatively impacted the ability of African-Americans to register, vote, and participate in the political process since the Reconstruction. Id. (citation omitted).
69 Id. The Court noted the use of two electoral practices that were disadvantageous to minority groups: the "majority vote" rule in primary elections and the
"place" rule. Id. "A 'majority' rule requires a run-off election between the two candidates with the most votes if no candidate receives a majority in the first election."
Racial Vote Dilution, supra note 64, at 697. The run-offs allowed white voters, who
allocated their votes to different candidates in the first election, to consolidate and
defeat a minority candidate who won by a plurality in the primary. Id. A "place" rule
required candidates to run for a specific post, thus resulting in head-to-head election
contests. Id. at 697-98. In districts that employ the "place" rule, white voters seeking
to polarize voting along racial lines know which candidate to vote for to defeat the
minority candidate. Id. at 698.
70 Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-67 (footnote omitted). The Court indicated that the
lack of African-American representation may have. been due to a nonminority "slating
committee." Id. The slating committee was a white-dominated association that controlled Democratic Party candidate selection in Dallas County. Id.
71 Id. at 767-68 (citations omitted). Focusing on Mexican-Americans in Bexar
County, the Court noted that the minority community had historically suffered from
discrimination in the areas of economics, education, employment, health, and politics. Id. at 768 (citation omitted). In addition to low income levels, the Court acknowledged that language and cultural barriers precluded Mexican-American
participation in community processes. Id. (footnote omitted). Based on cultural discrimination and the use of direct vote dilution techniques, such as poll taxes, the
Court concluded that the Mexican-Americans were disenfranchised in Bexar County.
Id. (citation omitted),
72 Id. at 769-70. Although noting that not every political and racial group has a
constitutionally protected right to representation in the state legislature, the Court
maintained that the multi-member districts at issue invidiously excluded Texas minority groups from effectively participating in political life. Id.
Refining the Regester standard, the Fifth Circuit considered a Louisiana district
66
67
68
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ultimate remedy, the Court added, would foster minority political
involvement by utilizing single-member voting districts."v Accordingly, the Court upheld the district court's order that the Dallas
and Bexar Counties be reapportioned into single-member
districts. 4
Four years later, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 5 the
Supreme Court applied the Regester "results" standard to a New
York redistricting plan designed to increase the representation of
Under the New York plan, three New York
minority groups.
counties were reapportioned in a manner that would increase the
that was divided into an electoral system of wards, from which the school board and
county government were elected. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th
Cir. 1973), affd sub. nom., East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976). Until the passage of the Voting Rights Act, African-Americans were precluded from voting. Id. As a result of subsequent African-American success in voting,
the county electoral system changed to "at-large" elections that prevented minorities
from electing their candidates. Id. The African-American voters filed suit, claiming
the at-large system unconstitutionally diluted their minority voting strength. Id. at
1300, 1301 (footnotes omitted).
The district court dismissed the claim because no population deviation within
the voting district existed. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that political access
rather than population disparity was the primary concern in establishing a vote dilution claim. Id. at 1303 (citations omitted). In so doing, the court of appeals extended
the Regester holding and articulated a set of factors to determine whether a claim had
been established. Id. at 1305. According to the Fifth Circuit, the factors of racial vote
dilution included: (1) lack of minority access to the candidate selection process; (2)
lack of response of elected officials to minority interests; (3) state policy favoring atlarge or multi-member districting; and (4) the existence of past discrimination that
precludes the effective participation of minority groups in the electoral process. Id.
The Zimmer court also identified other techniques that could enhance a showing
of voter discrimination. Id. The factors included, the court pointed out, the use of
large voting districts, the use of discriminatory electoral mechanisms, and noncompact districting. Id. (footnote omitted). Finally, the court concluded that vote dilution could be proved under an aggregate of factors and that all criteria need not be
demonstrated. Id. For a further discussion of the Zimmer factors, see Karlan, supra
note 18, at 190-91 (asserting that the absence of geographic compactness as a primary
factor in Zimmer marked the rejection of geography in remediation); McDonald, supra
note 8, at 1261-62 (noting that Zimmer was one of the most influential cases in clarifying the Regester standard).
73 Regester, 412 U.S. at 769. One author explained that the ultimate remedy in
Regesterwas the utilization of single-member districts based on more than geographic
boundaries. Karlan, Misreadings, supra note 18, at 187-88 & n.58 (citation omitted).
Single-member districts, the author posited, reflected the "community of interest"
formed by the minority groups, largely in response to prior discrimination. Id. at 188.
The author proffered that the single-member remedy was appropriate in Regesterbecause the claim of unconstitutional vote dilution arose from the use of multi-member
districts in minority counties. Id.
74 Id. at 765.
75 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
76 Id. at 165 (citing Regester, 412 U.S. at 765-67) (further citations omitted).
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number of nonwhite majorities."7 A group of Hasidic Jews challenged the scheme, claiming that it split their community's electoral district and therefore diluted their voting strength.7"
Writing for the plurality, Justice White rejected the plaintiffs'
challenge that the revised racially-aligned reapportionment plan violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.7 9 The use of
racial classifications when redistricting, the Court emphasized, was
permissible to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.8 Evaluating New York's racial criteria under the Regester standard, the Court
concluded that the redistricting scheme did not unfairly dilute
Hasidim voting strength.8 1 First, the Court reasoned that the New
York plan satisfied the "nonretrogression" requirement under § 5
of the Voting Rights Act.8 2 Second, although race had been used
in a purposeful manner to effect increased minority voting
77 Id. at 151-52. Three New York counties were subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act due to use of a literacy test and a determination that less than 50% of voting-age
residents in the same counties participated in the 1968 presidential election. Id. at
148 (footnote omitted). Under the previous plan, the entire Hasidic community was
situated in a single assembly district (61% nonwhite) and one senate district (37%
nonwhite). Id. at 152. To comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the legislature
increased the assembly district to a 65% nonwhite majority. Id. In attaining such a
figure, a portion of the white population, including half of the Hasidic community,
was assigned to an adjoining district. Id. The New York legislature submitted the
revised apportionment plan to the United States Attorney General for approval. Id. at
148-49. Although the initial plan was rejected, a revised reapportionment redistributed voters to increase minority strength in two majority white districts. Id. at 15051. For further discussion of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, see supra note 27.
78 UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 152-53. The plaintiffs claimed that although the
New York legislature was attempting to comply with the Voting Rights Act, the reapportionment plan was unconstitutional, as it was revised along racial lines. Id. at 155
(footnote omitted). The plaintiffs based their claim on both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 152-53.
79 Id. at 155-56.
80 Id. at 159, 162. The Court maintained that compliance with § 5 did not turn on
evidence of past discrimination in apportionment or prohibit the use of racial quotas.
Id. at 157, 162. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the minimum of registered
voters needed to create an African-American majority district was 50%. Id. at 162.
Beyond that, the Court noted, a state could choose whatever percentage necessary to
achieve the election of a minority representative and obtain approval of its apportionment plan. Id.

81 Id. at 165.
82 Id. at 163. Approval pursuant to § 5, the Court maintained, hinged on whether
the minority voting strength changed in comparison with the previous apportionment
plan. Id. Relying on Beer v. United States, the Court asserted that the New York reapportionment plan did not exceed the requirements imposed by § 5's "nonretrogression" requirements. Id. at 162-63 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)).
The Court noted that the plan, initially rejected by the Attorney General, may have
accomplished nothing more than the restoration of minority group voting strength to
previous levels. Id. at 150, 162-63. Consequently, the Court posited that the second
plan's creation of substantial nonwhite majorities was necessary to achieve the statu-
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strength, the Court conceded that the New York legislature had
not intentionally excluded white voters from the electoral process.8" Thus, the Court viewed the plan as an attempt to fairly allocate political power between white and nonwhite voters in the
county rather than minimize the strength of the white vote.14 Accordingly, the Court upheld the plan.8 5
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 8 6 however, the Court repudiated the
Regester standard, and instead required proof of a facially discriminatory intent to establish a vote dilution claim under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.8 7 In Bolden, the Court
tory rule of nonretrogression. Id. For further discussion of Beerand nonretrogression
requirements imposed by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, see infra note 153.
83 UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165 (citations omitted). Even if the county voting
occurred strictly by race, the Court continued, white voters would not be underrepresented in their share of the total population. Id. at 166.
84 Id. at 167.
85 Id. at 168. In concurrence, Justice Brennan agreed that race-conscious redistricting was a constitutionally valid method of complying with § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., concurring). Id. The Justice acknowledged, however,
the difficulties associated with even benign race-preferential practices, including: the
disguise of unconstitutional policies, the stimulation of latent race-consciousness, and
the negative perception of those individuals adversely impacted by the new plan. Id.
at 172-74 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Dissenting, ChiefJustice Burger posited that predetermined racial results contravened the very essence of the Constitution. Id. at 181 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). The
Chief Justice asserted that mere compliance with the Voting Rights Act afforded no
basis for the arbitrary plan enacted by the New York legislature. Id. at 184 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Calling the Court's decision "ironic," ChiefJustice Burger cautioned
that the use of unnecessary bias for or against a minority group may deflect the goal
of a homogeneous society. Id. at 186-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For additional
commentaries on United Jewish Organizations, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel
Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REv. 588, 602-03 (1993) (comparing the Court's holding in United Jewish
Organizationsto subsequent racial discrimination and voting rights cases); Blacksher &
Menefee, supranote 42, at 26 (stating that the Court's shift toward an intent standard
in vote dilution claims was indicated in United Jewish Organizations);Philip P. Frickey,
Judge Wisdom and Voting Rights: The JudicialArtist as Scholar and Pragmatis 60 TUL. L.
REv. 276, 291-92 (1985) (highlighting the assertion that in UnitedJewish Organizations,
the Court approved benign or remedial racial classifications that adversely impacted
nonminority voters).
86 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
87 Id. at 65, 66-68. For a detailed analysis of the intent standard established in
Bolden, see McKenzie & Krauss, supra note 9, at 155-58. According to one commentator, the Supreme Court abruptly changed "the landscape of vote dilution litigation" in
Bolden by abandoning the focus on access to the political process and instead favoring
an express intent requirement. Karlan, supra note 18, at 192. The attack on the
Regester "results" test began with PersonnelAdministratorof Massachusettsv. Feeney. Copeland, supra note 3, at 426 (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979)). In Feeney, the Court announced that "even if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose." Fee-
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considered a challenge by minority voters to the at-large", city
council elections in Mobile, Alabama.8 9 The African-American
plaintiffs contended that the Mobile electoral system unfairly diluted minority voting strength.90
ney, 442 U.S. at 272. In its decision, the Feeney Court relied on Washington v. Davis and
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. Id. (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977)).
In Washington v. Davis, a case involving racial discrimination in employment, the
Court held that a showing of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish a claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington, 426 U.S. at 232-33, 245. The plaintiffs, African-American police officers, challenged the constitutionality of a qualifying
test given to applicants for positions in the District of Columbia police force. Id. at
232-33. The plaintiffs claimed that the test had a disparate impact upon minority
applicants, thereby violating equal protection guarantees. Id. at 233. The Supreme
Court held that to establish an equal protection claim, demonstrating a disproportionate impact alone was not enough. Id. at 246-47. The plaintiffs, the Court continued, must also demonstrate a discriminatory motive or purpose. Id. at 245.
In Nevett v. Sides, the Fifth Circuit subsequently applied the discriminatory intent
standard to claims of vote dilution based on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 217 (5th Cir. 1978). In Nevett, however, the
court also determined that the intent requirement could be proven by using the Zimmer factors. Id. at 222-28. For a review of the Zimmer factors, see supra note 72.
88 In an at-large election, "[ellected officials [are] chosen by the voters of the State
as a whole rather than from separate congressional or legislative districts." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARv 125 (6th ed. 1990). At-large elections may dilute the minority vote
when voting is racially polarized. Richard L. Engstrom, The Reincarnationof the Intent
Standard: Federal Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28 How. L.J. 495, 496 (1985). If
voting runs along racial lines, at-large elections advantage a white majority and disadvantage an African-American minority. Id. Thus, the white majority may nullify the
effect of the African-American vote for a minority candidate. Id. Many studies indicate that African-Americans were typically underrepresented in at-large elections and
that these elections were especially popular in the South. Id. (citations omitted).
Under Regester, a challenge to an at-large voting system would prevail only if the
plaintiff could establish proof of a discriminatory effect or impact upon the minority
population. Id. at 497. After Bolden, however, the plaintiffs had to meet the more
stringent standard of proving that the motivation behind the adoption or continuance of the at-large system was to discriminate against the minority vote. Id.
89 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58. In 1911, Mobile adopted a City Commission form of
government, in which three commissioners exercised legislative, executive, and administrative authority. Id. at 59. After the election, the three commissioners would
then designate one of themselves as Mayor of the City. Id. (footnote omitted). Elections for the three posts were held every four years and candidates were elected by a
majority of the total at-large city vote. Id. at 59-60.
90 Id. at 58. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged that the Mobile voting plan contravened the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. The
district court and court of appeals found it significant that despite a 35% minority
population, no minority had ever been elected to the City Commission. Id. at 58 &
n.1, 73. Affirming the district court's judgment that Mobile's at-large elections discriminated against minority voters, the court of appeals ordered that the City Commission be replaced by a Mayor and City Council elected from single-member voting
districts. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 446 U.S.

55 (1980).
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Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart posited that the Fifteenth Amendment did not guarantee minorities the right to elect
preferred candidates, but merely prohibited purposeful discrimination that denied an individual's right to vote. 9 1 Because the Mobile at-large election plan neither prevented African-Americans
from registering nor hindered them from voting, the Court upheld
the electoral system.9 2
Addressing the Fourteenth Amendment challenge next, the
Court held that the use of an at-large electoral scheme in a multimember voting district violated the Equal Protection Clause only if
it was designed with the purpose of minimizing or cancelling out
the voting strength of racial minorities. 93 Consequently, Justice
Stewart recast the Regester test to reflect a discriminatory purpose
91 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62 (citations omitted). Relying on prior caselaw, the Court
noted that the grandfather clause in Guinn, which exempted white voters from voter
literacy requirements, was unconstitutional because its only plausible purpose was to
bypass the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347,
365 (1915)); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964) (upholding a congressional reapportionment, despite the claim that it had been racially gerrymandered, because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the redistricting was racially
motivated) (citation omitted); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341, 346 (1960)
(invalidating revised municipal boundaries because the Alabama legislature's purpose
was to exclude minority voters from municipal elections).
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, Justice Stewart proffered that § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act merely elaborated upon Fifteenth Amendment language, thereby incorporating a
requirement of discriminatory intent. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61 (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, the justice proffered that § 2's lack of legislative history tended to prove
that its effect did not differ from that of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. Justice Stewart also noted that § 2 merely restated Fifteenth Amendment prohibitions and went
uncontradicted during congressional hearings leading to the enactment of the legislation. Id. at 61.
92 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on Smith v.
Allwright and Terry v. Adams. Id. at 63-65 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)). The plaintiffs contended that both
Allwright and Adams supported the conclusion that an at-large system was unconstitutional because it polarized voting on the basis of race. Id. at 64. The Court distinguished those cases, however, noting that in both AllUwright and Adams, AfricanAmericans were denied the right to vote altogether. Id. Conversely, the plaintiffs in
the case at bar, the Bolden Court pointed out, were permitted to "register and vote
without hindrance." Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
93 Id. at 66 (citations omitted). The Court recognized that while multi-member
voting districts have been criticized for their "'winner-take-all'" aspects and tendency
to submerge minority votes, such districts are not unconstitutional per se. Id. at 65-66
(quotation omitted). The Court held that to demonstrate an invidious purpose, it was
insufficient to show that the minority group was unable to elect representatives proportional to its numbers. Id. at 66 (citations omitted). Disproportionate effects
alone, the Court continued, were inconsistent with the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and insufficient to support a claim of vote dilution. Id. at 66-67 (citations
omitted).
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standard.9 4 Under this new test, the Court proclaimed, it was insufficient to show that the minority group was unable to elect representatives proportional to its numbers.95 Disproportionate effects
alone, the Court reasoned, were inconsistent with the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause and insufficient to support a claim of
vote dilution.9 6 Instead, the Court asserted that a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the disputed plan was operated or conceived with
the sole purpose of furthering racial discrimination.9 7 Accordingly, the Court refused to uphold the plaintiffs' claim because
they failed to show any purposeful discrimination.9"
As a result of Bolden, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting
94 Id. at 68-70. Relying on language in Regester, which asked whether the "'multimember districts [were] being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of racial groups,'" the Court concluded that Regester essentially reflected a
discriminatory purpose standard. Id. at 69 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
765 (1973)). Although the Zimmer factors could be offered as evidence, those factors
alone, the Court concluded, could not support a finding of unconstitutional discrimination. Id. at 73.
Dissenting, Justice White asserted that use of the "totality of the circumstances"
test in the case at bar implied an invidious purpose. Id. at 102-03 (White, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). The Justice observed that evidence of racial bloc voting,
apathy toward the minority community, and past discrimination in the electoral process had denied minority participation in the Mobile political process. Id. at 103
(White, J., dissenting). Because these factors were present, Justice White claimed the
Mobile at-large election system would have satisfied the constitutional standard of
purposeful discrimination. Id.
95 Id. at 66 (citations omitted).
96 Id. at 66-67 (citations omitted).
97 Id. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)).
98 Id. at 73-74. Finally, the Court proffered that the Constitution did not confer all
"political groups," however defined, with the right to representation in proportion to
its numbers. Id. at 75 (footnote omitted). The Court rejected Justice Marshall's dissent that advocated a political group's constitutional right to proportional representation. Id. at 77-78 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964)) (footnote
omitted). Justice Marshall emphasized that the Constitution had been amended six
times in an effort to ensure that democracy remained in the hands of the populace.
Id. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Justice disagreed with the plurality's stringent burden of demonstrating discriminatory intent.
Id. InsteadJustice Marshall endorsed the "results" test as the constitutional standard
for vote dilution claims. Id.
Charging that Justice Marshall's proposition would move the Court toward becoming a "'super-legislature,'" Justice Stewart declared that the Equal Protection
Clause did not protect political groups from electoral defeat. Id. at 76, 77 (quotation
and footnote omitted). The Bolden Court reasoned that it is the state's right to delineate the mechanics of voting rights, absent constitutionally prohibited discrimination.
Id. at 76-77 (quotation omitted).
Concurring, Justice Stevens also questioned Justice Marshall's rationale. Id. at 8586 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Justice explained that a group's political power was
grounded upon its strength in numbers, rather than its ethnic, racial, or religious
characteristics. Id. at 88. Noting the thousands of municipalities across the nation,
Justice Stevens speculated that a subjective intent test could result in endless litigation
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Rights Act to ease the burden of showing purposeful discrimination in reapportionment plans. 99 In response to the new amendconcerning existing multi-member election districts. Id. at 92-93 (quotation and footnote omitted).
99 Kosterlitz, supra note 9, at 541. Because of the difficulty in proving intent to
discriminate, the legal community responded critically to the new Bolden test. Frank
R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent
Standard,69 VA. L. REv. 715, 737 (1983). Criticisms were based on three grounds. Id.
at 737 & n.110 (citations omitted). First, legal commentators contended that the case
was contrary to established precedent on vote dilution laws. Id. Second, scholars argued that the Bolden decision provided no guidelines on how to apply a difficult standard. Id. Finally, requiring plaintiffs to show a purposeful intent to discriminate
would compel the courts to inquire into the minds of lawmakers and public entitiesan exercise considered divisive to the judiciary. Id. Thus, the purpose of amending
§ 2 was to ease the burden of proof required under Bolden. Kosterlitz, supranote 9, at
541.
The Senate Report, which accompanied the new amendment, provided the following factors as guidelines for assessing the validity of a § 2 vote dilution claims:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority
group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic
process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance
the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as
part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are: whether there is a
significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the
particularized needs of the members of the minority group. [W]hether
the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualifications, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedures is tenuous.
S. REP. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 20607 (footnotes omitted). Although the accompanying Senate Report delineated the
nine factors, the report did not clarify how much weight should be given to any one
factor. Kosterlitz, supra note 9, at 544. Moreover, neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history of the amendment expressly articulated the bounds of a § 2
violation. Id. "Instead, the Senate Report and the language of section 2 indicated
that courts consider the 'totality of the circumstances' and flexibly use those factors to
determine a section 2 violation." Id. Consequently, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
grappled with the appropriate standard for vote dilution claims. Id.; see, e.g., United
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ment, the Court established a tripartite test for analyzing vote
dilution claims in Thornburgv. Gingles."'0 In Gingles, minority voters
in North Carolina challenged six multi-member voting districts created in the 1982 North Carolina apportionment plan. 10 1
Upholding the challenge, the Court articulated three criteria
that must be examined when analyzing a § 2 claim of racial bloc
voting.1 1 2 First, Justice Brennan enunciated that the minority
group must demonstrate that it was geographically compact and
sufficiently large to compose a majority in a single-member district. 10 3 Second, the Justice stated that the minority group must
States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that
racial polarization was the "keystone" of a vote dilution claim), appeal dismissed, 469
U.S. 976 (1984);Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 385 (5th Cir. 1984) (relying
on all nine factors delineated in the Senate Report to analyze a vote dilution claim);
United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1536, 1538, 1539 (11th Cir.
1984) (relying on factors such as past discrimination and the electoral system, but
highlighting the importance of racial polarization); Lee County Branch of NAACP v.
City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1482 (11th Cir. 1984) (cautioning that multiple factors-campaign expenditure, name recognition, party affiliation, religion, and use of
media-are important when analyzing seemingly polarized election outcomes).
100 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see Kosterlitz, supra note 9, at 551 (stating that Gingles was
the first case to address which amended § 2 factors must be specifically proven to
establish vote dilution in multi-member voting districts).
101 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34-35. Registered African-American voters specifically alleged that the apportionment prevented the minority group from electing preferred
candidates in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 35. After the voters initiated suit, but before the trial,
Congress amended § 2 and established a "results" test. Id. (citations omitted). The
district court, therefore, unanimously affirmed the plaintiffs' challenge, concluding
that the plan resulted in impermissible vote dilution in all the challenged districts. Id.
at 37-38 (citation omitted). On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
findings of the district court in five of the six voting districts. Id. at 35 n.2, 80. But see
Kosterlitz, supranote 9, at 552 (stating that despite a unanimous Court, the Justices in
Gingles were divided on the definition of racial polarization and the proper standard
by which to analyze vote dilution cases).
102 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. Racial bloc voting exists, the Court concluded, when
"'there is a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in
which the voter votes.'" Id. at 53 n.21 (quotation omitted). For an additional discussion of the Gingles tripartite test, see Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local
Legislative Delegations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 177
(1992) (characterizing vote dilution claims under the Gingles analysis as an ability to
elect claim); Edward J. Sebold, Note, Applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to SingleMember Offices, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2199, 2226-27 (1990) (positing that the Gingles tripartite test focused on the ability to elect, rather than the ability to participate in the
electoral process).
103 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50; cf. C. Robert Heath, Managingthe Political Thicket: Developing Objective Standards in Voting Rights Litigation, 21 STETSON L. REv. 819, 829 (1992)
(construing the first prong of the Gingles test to mean that voting age population, as
opposed to total population, is the correct measure of group voting strength); Karlan,
supra note 18, at 199 (emphasizing that Gingles elevated the concept of geographic
compactness in voting rights controversies). But see Grofman & Handley, supra note
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display political cohesiveness. 10 4 Lastly, the Justice asserted that
the minority group must demonstrate that the existence of majority bloc voting resulted in the inability to elect minority
candidates. 105
Applying this analysis to the North Carolina plan, 10 6 the Court
agreed with the lower court's determination that racial bloc voting
existed in the multi-member districts. 10 7 Although sporadic electoral success would not necessarily defeat a claim of majority bloc
voting, l 08 the Court concluded that a minority group's consistent
inability to elect preferred candidates demonstrated unequal access to the state's political process."0 9
13, at 389 (asserting that vote dilution remedies should require minority voting districts to be no more compact than existing districts).
Addressing the first prong, one commentator noted that large geographically dispersed groups would have difficulty in proving a causal relationship between vote
dilution and at-large elections. Heath, supra,at 841. Where minority groups are small
or dispersed, the author claimed, at-large elections are dilutive because such systems
submerge minority voters in a district where the majority is able to defeat minority
candidates solely on the basis of numerical superiority. Id. Large minority groups,
however, would be unable to show a submergence of minority voting strength. Id.
104 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. A group's political cohesiveness may depend on its tendency to vote as a bloc for candidates who affiliate themselves with the group's specific interests. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 42, at 59.
105 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. Justice Brennan explained that racial bloc voting occurs
when a majority group, because of its strength in numbers, consistently defeats candidates of a cohesive and geographically compact minority group. Id. at 4849 (footnote
omitted). Specifically, Justice Brennan announced that racial polarization or bloc voting occurs when "the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate
or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates." Id. at 62 (citation omitted).
Therefore, the majority rejected the State's use of both intent and causation-based
definitions of racial polarization. Id. at 61-62. The government, Justice Brennan concluded, misinterpreted racially polarized voting to mean that voters intentionally select or reject candidates on the basis of the candidate's race. Id. at 67.
106 After describing the district court's analysis of racially polarized voting in the
state, the Court elaborated on what constituted legally significant bloc voting. See id.
at 52-58.
107 Id. at 60.
108 Id. The election of some minority candidates occurred, the Court noted, only
because those minority candidates were incumbents or ran unopposed. Id. (footnote
omitted). A history of sustained electoral success, the Court emphasized, is more significant than positive results in a single election. Id. at 75 (quotations omitted).
Moreover, the Court asserted that proportional representation was not conclusive evidence of § 2 compliance. Id. at 74-75 (footnote and citations omitted). Accordingly,
the Court upheld the plaintiffs' challenge in five of the six districts. Id. at 77. Overruling the district court's order regarding the sixth district, however, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate racial bloc voting. Id. The Court
noted that in the past six elections, successful minority voters had achieved proportional representation. Id. at 77, 88.
109 Id. at 74. Specifically, the Court held "that the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a
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The Supreme Court addressed yet another form of racially discriminatory reapportionment in the recent case Shaw v. Reno. 110
Specifically, the Shaw Court considered whether the creation of an
irregularly-shaped single-member voting district constituted an impermissible racial gerrymander."'
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor began her analysis
by reiterating the purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment. 12 The
Amendment's central purpose, the Justice noted, was to unequivocorrelation between the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates." Id.
But see Kosterlitz, supra note 9, at 556 (asserting that Justice Brennan's polarized voting concept was joined only by a plurality of the Court, thus undermining the Justice's
view).
In concurrence, Justice White declined to accept that a voter's race, rather than
the candidates' race, was the crucial factor in identifying racially polarized voting.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring). Characterizing the plurality's opinion
as "interest group politics," Justice White proffered that the standard was inapposite
to congressional intent and the Court's holding in Whitcomb v. Chavis. Id. (citation
omitted).
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor objected to the majority's tripartite
test. Id. at 84-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). First, Justice O'Connor
contended that the majority view would result in violations of § 2 if the minority
group's preferred candidates were not elected in proportion to their population. Id.
at 91 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Second, Justice O'Connor maintained
that the majority's three part test made electoral success the "linchpin" of a vote dilution claim. Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Relying on electoral
success, the Justice criticized, however, largely ignored both the Regester-Zimmer factors
and Congress's intent in amending § 2. Id. at 92-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) (citations omitted). Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that the Gingles decision had created an "artificial" distinction between claims involving the ability to elect
and claims involving the ability to influence. Id. at 89 n.1 (O'Connor, J.,concurring
in judgment). Accordingly, Justice O'Connor concluded that a minority group unable to form a majority in a single-member district could combine with nonminority
crossover voters to elect preferred candidates. Id. In this manner, the Justice proffered, the minority group might still be able to elect preferred candidates. Id. As a
result, minority groups could form a majority in a single-member district, thus eliminating the need for the first part of the Gingles test. See id. at 89 & n.1 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment). But see Kosterlitz, supra note 9, at 560 (asserting thatJustice
O'Connor's conclusions misconstrued the majority's emphasis on racial polarization).
110 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). For a detailed analysis of the Shaw decision, see
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 606 (viewing Shaw as a replay of earlier
reapportionment controversies, in which intent was derived from the manner in
which the state drew district lines); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18, at 484 (stating that
Shaw urges policymakers to balance the tension between geographically-based election districts and political group interest); see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., U.S. Supreme
Court Year in Review, Race: The Most Divisive Issue, N.J.L.J., Aug. 23, 1993 (Supp.), at
10 (characterizing race as the "most divisive issue" during the 1992-93 Supreme Court
term). For decisions contemporaneous with Shaw, see Growe v. Emerson, 113 S.CL
1075, 1084 (1993) (applying the Gingles test to single-member voting districts) (footnote and citations omitted); Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 1157-58
(1993) (applying the Gingles factors to a racially-packed electoral district).
111 Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2820.
112 Id. at 2822 (citing U.S. CONSr. amend. XV).
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cally guarantee citizens the right to vote regardless of their race,
color, or former status as a slave. 113 Despite this constitutional
mandate, however, the Court acknowledged a long history of racial
114
discrimination in voting.
The Court then addressed the North Carolina voters' contention that the North Carolina reapportionment plan amounted to
an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. 15 Race-conscious redistricting, the Court acknowledged, was not per se unconstitutional. '16
The Court admitted, however, that redistricting legislation solely
constructed as a means to segregate races for voting purposes without any regard for traditional redistricting principles required a
compelling justification."17
Next, the Court acknowledged that race-conscious legislation
fell within the core prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
Accordingly, the Court asserted that express racial classifications
were subject to strict scrutiny review." 9 Fourteenth Amendment
113 Id. The essence of a democratic society, the Justice asserted, was "[t]he right to
vote freely for the candidate of one's choice." Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 555 (1964)).
114 Id. at 2822-23. According to Justice O'Connor, the right to vote had been historically denied to individuals on account of race. Id. The Justice delineated the
nation's attempts to circumvent the constitutional right to vote through the use of
both subtle and blunt instruments. Id. Examples of such techniques, the Justice
noted, included literacy tests and grandfather clauses. Id. at 2823. Additionally, Justice O'Connor described efforts to employ more subtle devices, such as the manipulation of district lines. Id. (citation omitted). The majority illustrated by noting an
1870s Mississippi congressional voting district that was drawn like a "shoestring along
the Mississippi River" by opponents of the Reconstruction. Id. (citation omitted).
The Justice explained that while African-American voters were concentrated in this
district, five other white majority districts remained. Id. (citation omitted). For further discussion of the history of racial discrimination in voting in the United States
and a description of various vote dilution techniques, see supranotes 3-7 and accompanying text.
115 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2823-24. Addressing this claim, the Supreme Court compared the North Carolina redistricting to some of "the most egregious gerrymanders
of the past." Id.
116 Id. at 2824. According to the majority, the appellants wisely stated that all raceconscious redistricting was not always unconstitutional per se. Id. (citation omitted).
Specifically, the Court noted that " [ t] his Court has never held that race-conscious state
decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances." Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. Justice O'Connor asserted that the central tenant of the Equal Protection
Clause was to prevent purposeful racial discrimination. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)). Therefore, the majority maintained that all express
racial classifications were included within the constitutional prohibition. Id.
H9 Id. at 2824-25 (citations omitted). The Court reasoned that because other types
of discriminatory classifications were subject to strict scrutiny, racial gerrymanders
would also be examined under a similar standard. Id. at 2825 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court generally employs strict scrutiny when reviewing legislation that
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principles, the Justice further noted, even extended to seemingly
race-neutral statutes. 120 Justice O'Connor concluded, therefore,
restricts fundamental constitutional rights. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, § 14.3,
at 575. In utilizing strict scrutiny, the Court will not defer to governmental decisions,
but will decide whether the classification meets a compelling interest. Id. Furthermore, laws classifying individuals on the basis of race or national origin will be treated
as suspect and subject to a strict standard of review. Id. § 14.3, at 576. Such classifications are immediately suspect because absent judicial inquiry, the Shaw Court noted,
there is no way to distinguish benign classifications from those motivated by notions
of racial inferiority. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citations omitted).
Benign racial classifications are remedial and designed to correct the remnants
of past discrimination. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, § 14.10, at 655-56. Unlike
express racial classifications, the Court has applied various levels ofjudicial scrutiny to
benign classifications. See id. § 14.10, at 655-57. In 1989, for example, the Supreme
Court held that racial classifications for affirmative action purposes were invalid unless strict scrutiny review was satisfied. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 505 (1989); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320
(1978) (holding that the use of exclusively racial criteria in university admissions programs did not promote a substantial state interest).
For example, in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, Justice Powell invalidated a medical school special admissions program that utilized a racial and ethnic
quota. Id. at 269-70, 274-75, 320. Stating that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to
all people, the Justice pronounced, "equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, than it is not equal." Id. at 28990. Because all racial classifications were immediately suspect, Justice Powell therefore applied strict scrutiny to the admissions program. Id. at 291.
TheJustice explained that the Fourteenth Amendment extended beyond its original goal of protecting former slaves to unilaterally apply to all individuals regardless
of race or ethnic background. Id. at 291-93. Characterizing racial classifications as
"odious to a free people," Justice Powell proffered that such distinctions may exacerbate racial tensions. Id. at 290, 298-99 (citations omitted). Distinguishing Bakke from
UnitedJewish Organizations,the Justice posited that in that case, disadvantaged minority
voters were able to improve their ability to participate in the electoral process without
excluding nonminorities from "meaningful participation." Id. at 305 (citation omitted). Absent an identifiable injury, Justice Powell declared that in Bakke, the medical
school's finding of "societal discrimination" would not justify the special admissions
program. Id. at 309-10 (citations omitted). To hold otherwise, the Justice declared,
would provide a remedy for any group claiming societal injury. Id. at 310. Finally,
Justice Powell concluded that although race was one element to be considered in a
university admissions program, it could not be the primary criteria. Id. at 315; see also
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 599 (characterizing Shaw as a "hardened
version" of Bakke); Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the ColorblindnessMode4 13 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 1, 2-3 (1993) (asserting that, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke minimized
the history of racial discrimination); Pildes & Niemi, supranote 18, at 503 (stating that
Shaw reflected the Bakke opinion, which prohibited race as the dominant factor in
public policymaking).
120 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). The Court further proffered that "'a racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.'" Id. (quotations omitted). This rule,
the Court declared, applies not only to ostensibly neutral classifications, but those
which are an "'obvious pretext for racial discrimination.'" Id. (quotations omitted);
cf Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 271, 277 (1939) (invalidating a voter registration
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that redistricting legislation expressly distinguishing among citizens on the basis of race must be narrowly tailored to-serve a compelling interest. 121 In so doing, the Court relied on prior law
supporting that district lines, drawn purposely for separating voters
on the basis of race, required careful review regardless of their un122
derlying motivations.
requirement that gave preferential treatment to individuals who were previously registered); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341, 348 (1960) (striking down an alteration of town voting boundaries that virtually segregated African-American and white
voters).
121 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (citation omitted).
The Court reasoned that
"[c] lassifications of citizens solely on the basis of race 'are by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'" Id. at
2824 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)) (further citation
omitted). Such classifications, the Court further accused, threaten to stigmatize individuals on the basis of their membership in a particular group as well as incite racial
hostility. Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 173 (1977)).
122 Id. at 2826 (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)). In Guinn
v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated the use of a literacy test in the voter
registration process, but "grandfathered" all persons who were previously registered
to vote. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 357. In so holding, the Court reasoned that the "grandfather clause," which related to a time when African-Americans were excluded from
voting within the state, had the effect of imposing the test on all minorities but only a
small number of white voters. Id. at 356-57. Although the literacy test was ostensibly
race-neutral, the Court determined that the state legislation could be explained for
no other reason than to circumvent Fifteenth Amendment prohibitions. Id. at 364-65.
Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
28-sided municipal boundary line in Tuskegee, Alabama. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340.
Although the redistricting legislation was race-neutral, the Court upheld the voters'
contention that the statute impermissibly removed all African-American voters from
the city. Id. at 341. In its decision, the Gomillion Court maintained:
If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely
concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.
Id. Although Gomillion was resolved under the Fifteenth Amendment, Justice Whittaker asserted that the "unlawful segregation of races of citizens" into separate voting
districts, stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring).
Finally, the Court extended the Gomillion rationale to congressional redistricting
in Wright v. Rockefeller. Wright, 376 U.S. at 53. In Wright, the Court considered a New
York reapportionment plan that excluded minority group members from one voting
district and, instead, concentrated them in three other districts. Id. at 53-54. The
majority agreed that the plan separated voters by race. Id. at 56. The Justices concurred with the district court's finding, however, that the districts were not drawn
solely along racial lines. Id. at 58. The Wright Court noted that because a majority of
the minority voters resided in one area, constructing voting districts that were devoid
of such concentrations would be extremely difficult. Id. at 57-58.
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The Court next acknowledged the difficulty in proving purposeful racial discrimination within single-member reapportionment plans. 123 The Court admitted, however, that proof of racial
discrimination was not impossible.1 2 4 For example, Justice
O'Connor noted, a reapportionment plan that concentrated a dispersed minority population into a single district would clearly disregard traditional redistricting principles.1 25 The Court cautioned,
however, that traditional criteria, while not constitutionally required, served as objective factors to rebut a claim of unlawful racial gerrymandering. 1 26 Moreover, the Justice commented that a
reapportionment plan may be so highly abnormal, that facially, it
could be nothing more than an attempt to segregate voters on the
basis of race. 12 ' Therefore, the Court concluded that in legislative
reapportionment, geographical appearances were significant in
128
demonstrating purposeful discrimination.
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor characterized racially segregated voting districts as tantamount to political apartheid.1 9 Such
classifications, the Justice cautioned, may reinforce impermissible
stereotypes13 ° and serve to undermine a representative democ123 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826. Reapportionment plans, the Court noted, are typically
not based on people, but rather addresses or tracts of land. Id. Proof difficulties also
arise, the Court recognized, because legislative redistricting often considers factors
such as race, age, economic status, and political preferences. Id. Accordingly, the
majority reasoned that a reapportionment plan concentrating group members in one
district and excluding them from another may reflect legitimate state interests. Id. By
comprising a majority of voters in that area, the majority maintained, the minority
group would be more likely to elect preferred candidates. Id. Thus, the Court concluded, a single-member voting district generally ensures minority voting strength. Id.
124 Id. Despite the difficulty in proof, however, the Court asserted that racial gerrymanders did not warrant a lesser standard of constitutional scrutiny than other types
of racial classifications. Id.
125 Id. at 2827. The Shaw Court recognized traditional districting principles as compactness, contiguity, and preservation of political subdivisions. Id. For further discussion of traditional districting principles, see Polsby & Popper, supra note 16, at 326-51
(discussing interdependence of compactness, contiguity, and equal population to ensure a valid electoral process).
126 Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2827 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor pointed out that
Justice Stevens had stated: "One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of
obscenity-'I know it when I see it'-as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have
sufficient probative force to call for an explanation." Id. (quotation omitted).
127 Id. at 2826 (citing Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341).
128 Id. at 2827. Specifically, Justice O'Connor declared that "reapportionment is
one area in which appearances do matter." Id.
129 Id. Racially segregated electoral districts encompassing vast geographical
boundaries, the Justice declared, may include voters with no more in common than
their skin color. Id.
130 Id. Racial gerrymandering, Justice O'Connor posited, "reinforces the percep-
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racy. 3 ' As a result, Justice O'Connor maintained that racial gerrymanders may exacerbate the very problems that majority-minority
districts seek to counteract. 13 2 Regardless of the proof problems,
the Court emphasized that, like other racial classifications, racial
gerrymanders were still subject to heightened review.1 33 Accordingly, the Court held that a plaintiff who challenged a reapportionment plan under the Equal Protection Clause stated a claim if such
claim alleged that the13redistricting
plan was unexplainable on any
4
other basis than race.
Addressing the dissenters' contentions, the Court repudiated
the notion that racial gerrymanders, like other types of vote dilution, warrant a more relaxed standard of judicial review. 1 35 First,
the majority distinguished racial gerrymanders from at-large electoral systems and multi-member districts. 136 Contrary to these practices, the Court pointed out, racial reapportionment classifies
tion that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which the [y] [sic] live-think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." Id. (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990) (holding that the assumed bias of African-American jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991) (declaring that society's progress as a
democracy would be stunted by racial stereotyping)).
131 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. 2827. According to justice O'Connor, racially-aligned redistricting undermines democracy by sending lawmakers the equally damaging message that
representation should be skewed to a particular group and not an entire constituency.
Id. EmphasizingJustice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Wright, the Shaw Court noted:
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial,
multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together
as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion
rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the
best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. Since that
system is at war with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing
here.
Id. 2827-28 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
132 Id. at 2827. Justice O'Connor cautioned that express racial classifications could
"balkanize" society into competing racial factions. Id. at 2832. The result, the Justice
added, could endanger goals embodied by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id.
133 Id. at 2826. Once established, the Court declared that racial gerrymanders
should receive the same degree of constitutional scrutiny as other race-conscious state
legislation. Id.
134 Id. at 2828. The Court declined, however, to determine whether or how a redistricting plan, facially explainable in nonracial terms, could be challenged. Id. Specifically, the Court refused to determine whether the creation of a "'majority-minority
district, without more' always [gave] rise to an equal protection claim." Id. (quotation
omitted). Instead, the Court limited its holding to conclude that the North Carolina
voters had stated a claim that was sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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voters by race.1 37 Moreover, because racial gerrymanders may lead
to impermissible stereotypes, the Justices reasoned that a reapportionment plan could not be characterized as a benign racial
13
classification. 1
Second, the majority distinguished racial gerrymanders from
political gerrymanders." 9 The Shaw Court noted that even political gerrymanders have been justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. 4 ° Moreover, the Court concluded that unlike
political gerrymanders, both Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and a long history of racial discrimination compelled the
conclusion that racial reapportionment was subject to heightened
review.1 4 ' The majority also rejected the notion that racial gerrymandering presents no constitutional difficulties when district
boundaries favor the minority.' 4 2 Racial classifications, the
Supreme Court attested, receive strict scrutiny, whether they burden or benefit a particular race. 43
Third, the Court disclaimed both the dissenters' and the district court's reliance on UnitedJewish Organizationsv. Carey.1 44 The
majority emphasized that the reapportionment plan approved in
United Jewish Organizations,unlike Shaw, comported with traditional
137 Id. The constitutionality of multi-member voting districts and at-large electoral
plans, the Court emphasized, hinged upon a result of vote dilution. Id. Conversely,
the Court proffered that the distinct harms presented by racial classifications required
a different analysis than vote dilution cases. Id.
138 Id. Justice Souter, dissenting, maintained that a racial gerrymander is harmless,
absent the dilution of a minority group's voting strength. Id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting). Refuting this notion, Justice O'Connor opined that efforts to segregate voters by race reinforces racial stereotypes and signals "elected officials that they
represent a particular group, rather than their constituency as a whole." Id. at 2828.
139 Id. The Shaw Court addressed the dissent's argument that the gerrymander at
issue was analogous to other types of gerrymanders, such as those formulated along
political lines. Id. The Supreme Court noted, however, that this assertion could not
be reconciled against prior law. Id.
140 Id. (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986)). Justice O'Connor
maintained, however, that past precedent did not require that both electoral techniques be subjected to the same level of constitutional scrutiny. Id.
141 Id. (citation omitted). The majority emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment reserved the strictest scrutiny for matters involving racial discrimination. Id.
142 Id. at 2829 (citation omitted).
143 Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The majority posited that
"equal protection analysis 'is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification.'" Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)). The Supreme Court further commented that "'[i]t is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all
persons suffer them in equal degree.'" Id. (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (citation
omitted)).
144 Id. at 2829-30. The majority declared that critical differences between Shaw and
UnitedJewish Organizationsdid not foreclose the "analytically distinct claim" at bar. Id.
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districting principles: compactness and population equality.1 45
Conversely, the Supreme Court concluded that a similar analysis
could not prevail in the case at bar, because an irrationallydesigned reapportionment plan offended basic principles of racial
equality.1 46 Maintaining United Jewish Organizations's viability, the
Court thus established an "analytically distinct claim" for racial gerrymandering, evidenced by a strangely-configured reapportionment plan. 4 7
Finally, Justice O'Connor rejected the assertion that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because redistricting usually compels some
consideration of race. 14' The Justice contended that legitimate racial factors must be proven rather than assumed. 1 49 Although benign racial classifications may be subject to a relaxed judicial
analysis, the Court maintained that strict scrutiny was necessary to
determine whether a racial classification was permissible at all.' 5 °
The Court next addressed North Carolina's contention that
compliance with the Voting Rights Act required the creation of a
majority-minority district.1 5 ' Rebutting this assertion, the Court
145 Id. at 2829 (citation omitted). The Shaw Court noted that in UnitedJewish Organizations, three Justices approved the New York apportionment plan because it comported with traditional districting principles, such as compactness and population
equality. Id. Such principles, the Court observed, afforded fair representation to minority groups which were sufficiently large and compact to otherwise form their own
voting district. Id. (citation omitted). In contrast to the instant case, the majority
noted that the Hasidic community did not allege that a highly irregular redistricting
plan was drawn along racial lines. Id.
146 Id. The Court acknowledged that UnitedJewish Organizations created a standard
by which nonminority voters could establish unlawful vote dilution. Id. at 2829-30.
That framework, the Court asserted, however, could not be applied to Shaw's irrationally-shaped reapportionment plan. Id. at 2829.
147 Id. at 2830. Against this background, Justice O'Connor concluded that nonminority voters could assert a new type of reapportionment claim based on the appearance of a voting district. Id.
148 Id. (citation omitted). Dissenting, Justice Souter asserted that strict scrutiny for
racial gerrymanders was inappropriate, as redistricting plans generally take racial considerations into account. Id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting). The existence of racial
bloc voting, Justice Souter continued, required the use of racial considerations when
redistricting. Id.
Justice O'Connor countered that the existence of racial bloc voting in some instances should not mean dissimilar treatment for all racial gerrymanders. Id. at 2830.
Instead, the Justice maintained that racial bloc voting must be proven on a case-bycase basis to establish a vote dilution claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. The majority addressed Justice Souter's contention that benign racial classifications warranted a relaxed standard of judicial review. Id. Absent strict scrutiny,
however, the Court maintained that it would be impossible to determine whether
racial discrimination was permissible. Id.
151 Id.
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contended that while a State's interest in complying with antidiscrimination laws was strong, such compliance must be constitutionally valid.15 Thus, the Justice suggested that North Carolina might
assert that the plan prevented "retrogression" under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 153 Additionally, the Supreme Court speculated that
the State may have reapportioned its districts as a means to avoid
minority vote dilution in violation of § 2.154 Lastly, the Justice discussed North Carolina's alternative argument that the reapportionment advanced a compelling state interest to remediate the effects
152 Id. The majority admonished the lower courts to be mindful of "what the law
permits, and what it requires." Id.
In contrast, once a redistricting scheme was deemed in violation of § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, Justice White questioned whether the state must do more than
merely maintain the status quo. Id. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting). In Shaw, the Justice noted that North Carolina chose to revise its plan in response to the Attorney
General's objections, rather than seek a ruling from the district court. Id. Justice
White supported his proposition with the Court's holding in UnitedJewish Organizations, which entitled the state to take such action. Id. (citation omitted).
The difficulty with the majority view, the dissent emphasized, was in applying a
manageable standard of review. Id. Justice White pondered whether narrow tailoring
required the creation of one majority-minority district or two districts where minority
groups were large enough to simply influence the political process. Id. Acknowledging the unworkability of a standard divorced from a tangible measure of constitutional harm, Justice White concluded that the state had demonstrated a compelling
justification. Id.
153 Id. at 2830. Under § 5's "nonretrogression" principle, the Court noted, a voting
process change would not be approved if it lessened minority voting influence. Id.
(citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)). In Beer v. United States, the
Court upheld a majority-minority district created under § 5 because it improved the
position of racial minorities. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141-42. Although the Shaw Court stated
that the Beer redistricting plan was nonretrogressive, the Court did not view similar
plans as immune from constitutional challenge. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830-31. To the
contrary, Justice O'Connor stated that § 5 did not unilaterally provide for racial gerrymandering in the name of nonretrogression. Id. at 2831. Moreover, the Justice acknowledged that a plan that went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid
retrogression would not be considered narrowly tailored. Id.; see also Richmond v.
United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1975) (stating that an annexation that reduced
the African-Americans in a district comported with § 5 where post-annexation districts
fairly reflected black voting power).
154 Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2831. The Supreme Court noted the State's contention that
the plan was necessary to comply with Gingles's interpretation of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. Id. (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)). See supra notes 10205 and accompanying text (explaining the Gingles tripartite test). The Shaw plaintiffs,
the Court pointed out, however, advanced three reasons why the North Carolina reapportionment plan was not required by § 2. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2831. First, the
Court emphasized the appellants' contention that the State's African-American population was extremely dispersed. Id. Second, the majority highlighted the voters' allegations that the minority group was not politically cohesive. Id. Third, the Court
noted the appellants' emphasis on recent electoral results indicating that North
Carolinians were willing to vote for minority candidates. Id.
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of past racial discrimination. 5 5 Leaving these issues unresolved,
the Court remanded the case to determine whether the North Carnarrowly tailored to achieve a
olina reapportionment plan was 156
compelling governmental interest.
Justice White dissented, calling the decision a departure from
equal protection jurisprudence.15 7 Justice White asserted that the
5
facts in Shaw mirrored those in UnitedJewish Organizations.11 Similar to the plaintiffs in United Jewish Organizations, the Justice
claimed, the North Carolina voters' influence in the political process had not been unfairly cancelled."5 9 The Justice concluded,
therefore, that the voters had not stated a cognizable claim because
the white majority in0 North Carolina could not plausibly argue
16
disenfranchisement.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831-32 (citations omitted). The Court noted the State could
assert a significant interest in eliminating past racial discrimination. Id. (citing City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-93 (1989)) (further citations omitted). Justice O'Connor declined to consider North Carolina's assertion that the creation of majority-minority districts was the only effective way in which to mitigate the
results of racially polarized voting. Id. at 2832. The Court further noted that three
Justices held in United Jewish Organizationsthat the use of race-based redistricting to
remedy bloc voting was constitutional only when sound redistricting principles were
employed. Id. (quoting United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1977)).
156 Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Spar Over Validity of a District Based on Race,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1993, at D21 (inquiring as to what extent the Constitution must
be color-blind).
157 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting); cf Linda Greenhouse, Court
Questions Districts Drawn To Aid Minorities, N.Y. TiMEs, June 29, 1993, at 1 (noting that
after thirty-one years as a Supreme Court Justice, the Shaw decision marked Justice
White's final day on the Supreme Court). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in
Justice White's dissent. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834.
158 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (citing UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165-68).
160 Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that under the revised redistricting plan, white voters constituted a majority in 10 of 12 districts totalling 83% of the
districts, while comprising 76% of the state's population. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting). Relying on Justice White's dissent, one commentator concluded that Shaw
drew an inconsistent distinction between oddly configured voting districts and those
more traditionally designed. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18, at 499 & n.74 (citing
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White,J., dissenting)). According to Pildes and Niemi, this
dichotomy underscored the majority's analysis of the "analytically distinct" district appearance claim. Id. at 499. To fully understand Shaw, Pildes and Niemi opined, one
must recognize the central concern with "value reductionism." Id. at 500. Value reductionism occurs when a decision involving multiple factors is simplified to a onedimensional problem. Id. The use of this type of decisionmaking, the authors concluded, may appear compromised through oversimplification. Id. Value reductionism, therefore, may lead to a different type of constitutional injury, known as
"expressive harm." Id. at 506. Expressive harm occurs through public perception
created by governmental action, rather than tangible consequences. Id. at 506-07.
Applying these principles to Shaw's "analytically distinct" district appearance
claim, Pildes and Niemi asserted that the Court did not invalidate all voting districts
155

1994]

NOTE

2187

To support his position, the Justice delineated two types of impermissible electoral practices: direct deprivation of voting
rights 161 and the indirect weakening of voting strength.1 6 2 Examples of direct deprivations of the right to vote, Justice White explained, included the implementation of a literacy test or poll
tax. 63 Indirect vote dilution, the justice noted, required showing
both a discriminatory intent and effect in diminishing a minority
group's political influence. 6 4 The Justice asserted that because racial considerations inevitably impact redistricting lines, 165 the identifiable group must demonstrate that it has been effectively shut
66
out of the electoral process.
drawn along race-conscious lines. Id. at 500. The nature of redistricting, the authors
explained, required the use of multiple factors to represent interest groups, political
subdivisions, and proximity between elected officials and constituents. Id. As a result,
Pildes and Niemi proffered that the use of race is permissible as long as it constitutes
one of several factors in the redistricting process. Id. at 501.
161 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980)). Justice White
stated that minority group members were traditionally required to demonstrate that
the reapportionment had the intent and effect of diminishing their electoral participation. Id.
163 Id. Because neither practice was at issue, the Justice dismissed any further discussion of such measures. Id.
164 Id. & n.1. The Justice noted that indirect vote dilution is an unconstitutional
practice which "'affects the political strength of various groups.'" Id. at 2824 (White,
J., dissenting) (quoting Bolden, 446 U.S. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
The Justice discussed a recent argument that the standard of discriminatory intent
should be lessened once the intentional discrimination was proven. Id. n.1 (citing
Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1028 (1991)). Leaving this issue to be resolved another day, Justice White noted
that the courts have still insisted upon some showing of injury to ensure that a meaningful remedy could be imposed. Id. at 2824 (White, J., dissenting).
165 Id. TheJustice articulated that lawmakers are conscious of race when redrawing
district lines, just as they are cognizant of factors such as economic status, religious
beliefs, and political persuasion. Id. Further, the Justice posited that redistricting
plans inevitably reflect group interests and other partisan goals. Id. at 2835 (White,J.,
dissenting).
166 Id. The Justice proffered that to allow judicial intervention whenever partisan
aims impacted the redistricting process would create constant intrusion. Id. The
threshold requirement, the Justice added, was not established by mere lack of success
at the polls, but when the minority group did not have the same opportunity as the
majority to elect their candidates. Id. (quotation omitted). In support of his view,
the Justice determined that the Court applied the same criteria in White v. Regester to
invalidate a redistricting plan. Id. (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766
(1973)). In Regester, the Justice emphasized, the minority group's history, marginal
economic status, and lack of legislative response caused the group's exclusion from
politics. Id. (citation omitted).
Relying on his opinion in Davis v. Bandemer,Justice White also declared that electoral influence was not restricted to electoral success. Id. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986)). The Justice concluded
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Relying on United Jewish Organizations,Justice White emphasized that the creation of majority-minority districts, absent a discriminatory purpose or effect, may be constitutional.1 67 The
Justice maintained that the dual elements of purpose and effect,
which have traditionally governed race-conscious redistricting
plans,16 8 could not be based on mere appearances. 169 Although
lack of compactness and contiguity provide an indicia of unlawful
gerrymandering, the Justice opined, those factors do not conclusively establish constitutional infirmity. 170 Justice White, therefore,
chastised the Court's standard as unworkable because a traditionally-shaped voting district could be equally discriminatory as an irthat an equal protection violation existed only when certain voters' political influence
was substantially impaired. Id. (citing Davis, 478 U.S. at 133).
167 Id. at 2837 (White, J., dissenting). Writing for the Court in UnitedJewish Organizations, Justice White explained that although minority voting strength was increased
by the New York plan, white voting power was not unfairly compromised. Id. (citing
United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977)). Applying that case to the
issue at bar, the Justice noted that North Carolina redistricted the state to comply with
§§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 2837-38 (White,J., dissenting). Against this
rubric, the Justice found it incredulous to suggest that the North Carolina congressional districts were redrawn for the sole purpose of discriminating against the majority group. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2840 (White, J., dissenting). The Justice refuted the majority's interpretation of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, which held that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts created an equal protection challenge. Id. at 2839 (White, J.,
dissenting) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)). Justice White stated
that the touchstone of Gomillion was its focus on the purported effect of eliminating
African-American voters from city limits. Id.
Furthermore, the Justice disagreed with the majority's reliance on Wright v. Rockefeller. Id. In Wright, the Justice recalled that the Court declined to invalidate a congressional redistricting plan because the plaintiffs failed to establish discriminatory
intent. Id. (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 55, 58 (1964)). Justice White
reasoned that a decision based on the failure to establish requisite intent did not
imply that it was unnecessary to prove discriminatory effect. Id. Justice White added
that Wright's relevance was its demonstration that a plaintiff asserting unconstitutional
race-conscious redistricting could state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id. at 283940 (White, J., dissenting). The Justice declared, however, that a challenge must be
supported by a showing of discriminatory intent and effect. Id. at 2840 (White, J.,
dissenting).
169 Id. Justice White suggested that racial gerrymanders come in many forms: atlarge elections, minority group fragmentation among several districts (cracking),
placing a large minority population within a larger white population (stacking), and
concentrating minority voters into districts where they comprise the majority (packing). Id. (citations omitted). In each case, the Justice acknowledged that race was
consciously used to affect voting strength. Id. Justice White proffered, however, that
challengers to such schemes were required to demonstrate the requisite discriminatory purpose and effect. Id.
170 Id. at 2841 (White,J., dissenting). In support of his premise, the Justice posited:
"'[D]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes'" were no more indicative of partisan districting than traditionally drawn districts. Id. n.9 (quoting Sickels,
supra note 6, at 1300).
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regularly-shaped one.17 1
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun championed a "results"
test when evaluating malapportionment claims. 7 2 Racially-aligned
redistricting, the Justice maintained, did not violate equal protection principles unless the plan minimized the voting strength of a
particular group or denied such a group equal opportunity in the
political process. 7 ' Accordingly, Justice Blackmun found it ironic
that a plan that sent North Carolina's first African-American representatives to Congress since the Reconstruction violated the Equal
Protection Clause.'7
Also dissenting, Justice Stevens asserted that the North Carolina redistricting plan was permissibly drawn for the purpose of facilitating minority representation in Congress. 175 Justice Stevens
maintained that there were no constitutionally prescribed requirements related to the shape of a voting district.176 Justice Stevens
further asserted that the Equal Protection Clause was violated only
by evidence of invidious discrimination, such as a district designed
solely to impede minority voting strength. 77 Justice Stevens con171 Id. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting). The Justice emphasized that compactness
had never previously been a prerequisite to finding a congressional district constitutional. Id. (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 & n.18 (1973)). Justice
White claimed that a regularly-shaped voting district could also perpetuate racial discrimination. Id. The Justice concluded that the majority's approach could hinder
voluntary efforts to ensure minority representation, particularly in areas where the
population was geographically dispersed. Id.
172 Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun characterized the majority's new "'analytically distinct claim'" as an abandonment of settled law. Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.; see Lynne Duke, Advocates Say Justices Muddy Voting Rights, WASH. PosT, June
30, 1993, at A8 (noting that North Carolina Representatives Melvin L. Watt and Eva
M. Clayton were the State's first African-American representatives since the
Reconstruction).
175 Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2844 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed that the
district's shape was "so bizarre" that it was admittedly drawn for the benefit or detriment of a cognizable voting group. Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover,
the Justice deemed the presence of "bizarre and uncouth" district lines to be "powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose." Id.
176

Id.

Id. at 2844 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Unconstitutional gerrymanders, Justice Stevens contended, are distinguished by the controlling group's ability to enhance its
power at the expense of the minority group. Id. The Justice proffered that the Equal
Protection Clause was violated only when a state draws boundaries designed to diminish minority electoral strength. Id.The Equal Protection Clause is not violated, the
Justice emphasized, when the majority uses its power to facilitate the election of a
member of an underrepresented group. Id. Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded
that when the districting process is used to equalize an inequitable allocation of electoral power, no constitutional violation occurs. Id.
Repudiating Justice Stevens's dissent, the majority maintained that equal protection analysis did not turn on the race of individuals advantaged or disadvantaged by a
177
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cluded that adequate representation for partisan interests should
include the minority group for whom the Equal Protection Clause
17
was enacted.

In the final dissent, Justice Souter declared that the majority
had carved out a narrow exception to the general review applied to
racial gerrymandering.1 79 Placement in a particular voting district,
the Justice proffered, did not deny a person a constitutional right
possessed by others1 80 because the use of racial criteria in redistricting was permissible."8 Accordingly, Justice Souter advocated a categorical approach for racial gerrymandering instead of heightened
2
scrutiny.

1

specific classification. Id. at 2829 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 494 (1989); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring)). The Court thus concluded
that racial classifications must undergo strict scrutiny even when races are equally
burdened. Id. Distinguishing racial from political gerrymanders, the Shaw majority
stressed that the common law did not compel precisely the same strict scrutiny for
each. Id. at 2828. To the contrary, the Court asserted that the history of racial discrimination in voting, combined with Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions, warranted the strictest scrutiny for racial gerrymanders. Id.
178 Id. at 2844-45 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted the majority's aversion to defining a group by race in redistricting to remediate the underrepresentation
of a minority group. Id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice declared, however, that if such a practice was permissible as a means to ensure adequate representation for union members, rural voters, HasidicJews, or based on nationality or political
affiliation, it was equally permissible to do so for racial groups specifically protected
by the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2844-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 2845 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that the Shaw Court had
created a new cause of action under which a bizarrely-shaped apportionment plan
would be subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
180 Id. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to justice Souter, the distinction
between reapportionment and other impermissible racial classifications is that in the
latter category race is used at the expense of a member of another race. Id. For
example, Justice Souter distinguished electoral redistricting from other race-conscious contexts, such as the awarding of government contracts where giving a minority
group member priority would necessarily exclude other individuals on racial grounds.
Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (striking down racially-based municipal set-asides)
(citation omitted)); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-83
(1986) (invalidating the use of race to trump seniority in teacher layoffs). By contrast, the Justice noted that redistricting does not prevent any individual from exercising the constitutional right to cast a ballot. Id.
181 Id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting). Unlike other racial classifications, Justice
Souter noted that the use of race in reapportionment may be necessary to comply
with the Voting Rights Act. Id. (citing UnitedJewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 16162, 180 (1977)).
182 Id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting). In setting up this approach, Justice Souter
noted a final distinction between redistricting and other racial classifications. Id. at
2846-47 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Justice posited that a heightened-scrutiny standard was triggered when racial preferences result in a disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose. Id. Under such an analysis, Justice Souter concluded, an electoral
plan that failed to demonstrate a disparate impact was not subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting). Therefore, the Justice determined
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The Shaw Court, Justice Souter contended, however, created
alternative levels ofjudicial review.1 8 3 Application of different standards, the Justice proffered, would recognize claims devoid of constitutional harm.1 4 Regularly-shaped voting districts, the Justice
contrasted, would continue to require a showing of disparate impact.18 5 Justice Souter therefore concluded that the Court failed to
86
justify its departure from prior redistricting cases.'
At the intersection of law and social policy, Shaw demonstrates
that race remains a complex and unresolved issue.' 87 On the one
hand, race-conscious redistricting provides a powerful tool in effecting equal representation for minority groups.1 88 Conversely,
racially-aligned voting districts may hinder coalition-building and
the marketplace of ideas' 8 9 within a diverse society. 190 Balancing
that when communities are racially mixed and the political strength is not diluted for
any group, compliance with the Voting Rights Act did not require application of strict
scrutiny review. Id.
183 Id. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 2848-49 (Souter, J., dissenting). The creation of an "analytically distinct
claim," whose pleading requirements would be so infrequently met, the Justice contended, could produce an aberrational effect. Id. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Justice explained that the shape of the challenged district was so bizarre, that few
electoral districts would be subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
185 Id. The Justice further asserted that when sufficiently pleaded, the state would
be required to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest under the majority's
rationale. Id. Conversely, the Justice maintained that other types of redistricting
would require proof of disparate impact, or, alternatively, an illegitimate state purpose. Id. (citation omitted).
186 Id. at 2849 (Souter, J., dissenting).
187 See id. at 2819 (noting that the definition of the "right" to vote and the issue of
race-conscious state measures aimed at assisting minority group representation
presented two of the most "complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent
years"); Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 651 (asserting that Shaw's "murkiness" results when "law meets race").
188 Lani's Last Laugh, THE NATION,July 19, 1993, at 1. According to one commentator, 13 more African-Americans and 6 Hispanics were sent to Congress as a result of
OS.,June 30, 1993,
redistricting. Jim Morrill, Watt Defends Snakelike 12th, CHARLO
at 2C. Additionally, since 1990, the nation has seen the creation of 26 new majorityminority districts. Duke, supra note 174, at A8.
189 One commentator has stated that classifications based solely on race hamper "a
free marketplace of ideas within the black community, a cornerstone of intellectual
strength and progress." Bruce Fein, Redistricting by Race: A New Racism, LEGAL TIMES,
July 20, 1992, at 26.
190 David Saffell, Draw the Line on Gerrymandering,CHI. TmB., May 27, 1993, at 31.
Saffell noted the irony of a diverse nation that has increasingly created singularly
ethnic and racial electoral plans. Id. Since the 1970s, the states have attempted to
remedy longstanding patterns of discrimination and increase minority representation. Id. Saffell identified fundamental problems, however, that may underlie racial
gerrymandering. Id. For example, Saffell noted, majority-minority districts could hinder coalition-building among a multiplicity of racial and ethnic groups. Id. The result, Saffell pronounced, could impede efforts to build a homogeneous society. Id.
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these interests, the Shaw Court fairly recognized the necessity of
some remedial measures to counteract longstanding racial
discrimination."'
Nevertheless, the majority cautioned against the use of race as
a dominant redistricting factor. 192 While acknowledging traditional districting principles,19 3 the Court declined to articulate
affirmative criteria for evaluating strangely configured reapportion191 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (noting that while the plaintiffs' argued for a "colorblind" Constitution, it was conceded that racial redistricting would not always be impermissible); see Fair, supra note 119, at 79 (rejecting the color-blind theory and stating that racial classifications should be governed by intermediate scrutiny); Grofman
& Handley, supra note 13, at 402 (disagreeing with the assertion that the Voting
Rights Act contradicts the Constitution's color-blind spirit).
192 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (noting that while racially-aligned redistricting was not
impermissible per se, a voting district that was solely explainable as an effort to separate voters by race established a claim under the Equal Protection Clause). Popular
reaction to Shaw characterized the decision as an attack on race-conscious redistricting. Pildes & Niemi, supranote 18, at 498 n.70. (citations omitted); see, e.g., Max Boot,
Supreme Court Rules that 'Bizarre'DistrictsMay Be Gerrymanders,CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR,
June 30, 1993, at 7 (commenting that Shaw "throws into doubt the way the Justice
Department has been enforcing the 1965 Voting Rights Act, designed to guarantee
minorities political representation")); Greenhouse, supra note 157, at Al (stating that
"[a] sharply divided Supreme Court ruled today that designing legislative districts to
increase black representation can violate the constitutional rights of white voters").
Conversely, it has been asserted that Shaw is triggered only when race becomes the
pervasive factor in redistricting. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18, at 501; see also
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 604 (stating that the Shaw Court warned
against redistricting that "went too far"); Polsby & Popper, supra note 16, at 654 (declaring that Shaw addresses "how far a legislature may go in controlling who is elected
to it"). For cases discussing the Court's slow abandonment of preferential minority
treatment, see City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (concluding that racial classifications were not per se unconstitutional, and would be subject to strict scrutiny review); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84
(1986) (holding local school board efforts to maintain a racially integrated faculty by
laying off senior nonminority teachers before minority teachers invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause). But see Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 59697, 600 (1990) (holding that "benign" affirmative action was not subject to strict scrutiny, but would be upheld if there was a substantial connection to an important congressional interest and did not unduly burden nonminorities).
193 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (advocating "compactness, contiguity, and respect
for political subdivisions" as indicia that a district may be racially gerrymandered).
Although 25 states have established compact redistricting requirements, such efforts
have been largely unsuccessful. Pildes & Niemi, supranote 18, at 528. Recent developments such as quantitative measures, however, may provide guidelines for assessing
the shape of election districts. Id. at 536. The mechanical application of quantitative
methods, though, must be reviewed against a backdrop of local concerns. Id. at 539;
see also Bryant et. al., supranote 7, at 280-81 (suggesting criteria to be utilized in conjunction with computer technology that would restrict partisan gerrymandering); Polsby & Popper, supra note 16, at 654, 677 (characterizing Shaw's treatment of district
compactness as "nebulous" and advancing antigerrymandering principles of equal
population, contiguity and compactness).
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ment plans. 194 Absent quantitative guidelines, the resulting caseby-case judgments are likely to be inconsistent and
unpredictable. 9 5
Furthermore, racially gerrymandered districts remain a questionable remedial strategy.1 96 Single-member plans may not fulfill
the vision of an empowered minority franchise. 1 97 Single-member
districts also do not effectively address concerns related to proportional representation. 198 Therefore, the need emerges for new solutions that will extend principles of democracy to areas of
194 See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting) (stating "how [the Court]
intends to manage this standard, I do not know").
195 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18, at 528. One commentator predicts that the

Shaw ruling will mean "'lots of litigation.'" Morrill, supra note 188, at 2C; see also
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 623-24 (stating that "there is a strong risk

that Shaw will be nothing more than an invitation to ad hoc judicial review of redistricting decisions").

For example, a Louisiana congressional voting district was recently ordered to be
redrawn as the result of an unlawful racial gerrymander. Asserting Bias,Judges Order
Louisiana to Change Districts,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1993, at A8. In that case, Louisiana

created a second majority-minority district to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Id.
To create such a district, the state drew an irregularly-shaped plan, reflecting a dispersed African-American population. Id. When the plaintiffs sought declaratory approval of the plan in the district court, the presiding judges made their ruling
following the Supreme Court's Shaw decision. Id. See generally Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Plan to Delve Anew Into Race and Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1993, at 24L
(delineating reapportionment challenges from Georgia and Florida currently before
the Supreme Court).
196 See Guinier, supra, note 9, at 1434 (questioning the wisdom of utilizing singlemember voting districts).
197 Id. at 1447, 1449. Professor Lani Guinier stated that single-member districts,
traditionally associated with minority electoral success, did not achieve effective African-American political representation. Id. at 1449. In single-member districts, the
author posited, individual candidates, lacking political party support within their locale, face costly grass-roots campaigns. Id. at 1449-50. Ultimately, Guinier continued,
reduced campaign efforts minimized African-American voter participation. Id. at
1449. Therefore, Guinier declared that single-member districts may defeat their proffered goals through the exclusion of low-income voters. Id. at 1450.
Additionally, Guinier stated that African-Americans cannot achieve effective
political representation without coalition-building within the legislatures. Guinier,
supra note 18, at 1116. According to Guinier, legislative polarization may prevent
minority representatives from developing cross-racial alliances essential to the policymaking process. Id. at 1116, 1123. As a result, Guinier proclaimed that electing African-American officials may merely shift racial polarization from the electoral process
to the legislative body. Id. at 1116. Consequently, Guinier advanced a new approach
to effective minority representation, based on proportional representation. Id. at
1080. For another critique of single-member voting districts, see Guinier, supra note
16.
198 Saffell, supra note 190, at 31. Due to shifting populations, the author declared
that it has become more difficult to draw districts lines that favor one minority group,
without disadvantaging another set of political interests. Id.
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minority underrepresentation.1 99
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court first entered the "political
thicket" 20 0 of reapportionment controversies.2 0 1 Since then, each
decade has reflected a new generation of voting rights issues.20 2
Consequently, the Supreme Court must again promulgate clear,
principled criteria that will distinguish effective representation
from unlawful gerrymanders in the 1990s.
PatriciaDoyle
199 Richard H. Pildes, Beyond Gerrymandering: Cumulative Voting Promotes Civil Rights
Without Racial Balkanization, L.A. DAiLYJ., Mar. 1, 1993, at 6. Professor Pildes outlined
a new approach to minority electoral representation, known as "cumulative voting,"
where each voter is given as many votes as there are seats to fill. Id. Voters are thus
able to distribute their votes in any manner. Id. This technique would enable voters
to express not only their candidate preferences, but also the value of those preferences. Id. In a five candidate race, for example, a voter could cast a ballot for each
candidate, three times for one candidate and twice for another, or allot all votes to
the same candidate. Id. Under such a scheme, minority voters have a greater chance
to elect preferred candidates, even when facing a strong majority. Id.
According to Pildes, cumulative voting has several advantages. Id. First, the approach avoids the need to construct racially-aligned district lines. Id. Moreover, cumulative voting would allow voters to adopt their own interests and affiliations, free of
assumptions that minority groups unilaterally share the same political values. Id.
On the other hand, cumulative voting could increase campaign costs and fragment political parties because representatives would have relate to a broader constituent base. Id. Nevertheless, cumulative voting has been successfully used by certain
corporations in electing boards of directors. Id.; see also, Aleinikoff & Issacharoff,
supra note 85, at 627-28 (positing that modified elections, combined with limited or
cumulative voting, offered promising techniques for achieving semiproportional representation); Grofman & Handley, supranote 13, at 394-400 (offering alternative electoral systems that include "limited voting," "weighted voting," and "power-sharing
devices"); Guinier, supra note 19, at 1512 (preferring at-large elections with cumulative voting).
200 Justice Frankfurter first referred to a redistricting challenge as a "political
thicket" in Colegrove v. Green. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). For a
detailed discussion of Colegrove, see supra note 42. Since that time, the phrase has been
associated with judicial intervention into new issues surrounding voting rights litigation. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18, at 528 (citation omitted).
201 Pildes & Niemi, supra note 18, at 586 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
Shaw has been characterized as the "Baker v. Carr of the Voting Rights Act era." Id.
Pildes and Niemi declared that in Shaw, the Court established a new type of constitutional claim based on the design of voting districts. Id. Similar to Baker, the authors
posited, Shaw posed controversial voting rights issues. Id. Pildes and Niemi further
maintained that Shaw will hopefully be followed by a case similar to Reynolds, which
followed Baker, that will provide quantitative standards for district compactness. Id. at
587; see also Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 622 (stating that "Shaw would
• . . be the Baker of compactness standards, with its own Reynolds presumably to
follow").
202 See Grofman & Handley, supranote 13, at 348-49 (stating that voting rights litigation in the 1990s will shift from at-large elections or multi-member voting districts to
single-member plans).

